KOREA FOCUS

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

조선의 초점

when and how?

VOL. 1, NO. 3

KOREA FOCUS

"The long historical continuity, during which Korean cultural and social patterns became firmly fixed, has left a unique heritage to the Koreans. They became a nation of one race, one language, one culture, and one proud past. The homogeneity of the Korean people is a significant factor in an evaluation of Korean political problems. Whatever disunity and diversity appear on the Korean political stage are not products of fundamental differences in race or culture within the Korean community, but are consequences of less substantial causes."

George M. McCune
"Korea Today"
Harvard University Press

This issue of Korea Focus *was prepared by an editorial task force comprised of Professor Robert Ante, Professor Howard L. Parsons, Professor Fred J. Carrier, George B. Murphy, Jr., Angelo D'Angelo, Ruth C. Norrick, Joseph Brandt, executive editor, and Gerald Cook, managing editor. The current developments respecting Korean unification have made it necessary to postpone publication of a number of articles planned for this issue.*

The New York Public Library

Korea Focus is published periodically by the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, 160 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y., 10010. Manuscripts and other editorial material are solicited for Korea Focus. *Likewise letters, clippings, editorial comments. Help us make this magazine a popular and useful publication.*

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Joint Statement of North and South Korea

Kim Yong Ju, Director of the Organizational Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, greets Li Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency on the latter's visit to Pyongyang.

Following is the text of the joint statement of North and South Korea issued on July 4, 1972 and signed on behalf of their governments by Kim Yong Ju, Director of the Organizational Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and Li Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency:

Talks were held recently in Pyongyang and Seoul for discussing the question of improving the relations between the north and the south and reunifying the divided country.

Li Hu Rak, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, visited Pyongyang in the period from May 2 to 5, 1972, and had talks with Kim Yong Ju, Director of the Organizational Guidance Department in Pyongyang, and Second vice-Premier Pak Sung Chul, on behalf of Director Kim Yong Ju, visited Seoul in the period from May 29 to June 1, 1972, and had talks with Director Li Hu Rak.

At these talks the two sides had an open-hearted exchange of opinions with the common desire to achieve the peaceful reunification of the country at the earliest possible date and attained big success in promoting mutual understanding.

In this course, the two sides reached a complete accord of view on the following points to dispel misunderstanding and distrust between the north and the south caused by the absence of meeting for a long period and ease the tension at its high pitch and, furthermore, promote the reunification of the country:

1. The two sides reached an agreement on the following principles of the reunification of the country:

Firstly, reunification should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference;
Secondly, reunification should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side;
Thirdly, great national unity should be promoted first of all as one nation, transcending the differences of ideology, ideal and system.

2. The two sides agreed upon refraining from slandering and calumniating the other side and from committing armed provocations, big or small, and upon taking active measures for preventing incidents of unexpected military conflicts, in order to ease the tension between the north and the south and create an atmosphere of trust.

3. The two sides agreed upon realizing versatile interchange in various fields between the north and the south to restore the national ties now severed, promote mutual understanding and accelerate independent peaceful reunification.

4. The two sides agreed upon rendering active cooperation in bringing to an early success the north-south Red Cross talks now in progress amid the great expectation of the whole nation.

5. The two sides agreed upon installing permanent direct telephone links between Pyongyang and Seoul to prevent unforeseen military incidents and deal directly, promptly and, accurately with the questions arising between the north and the south.

6. The two sides agreed upon forming and operating a North-South Coordination Committee with Director Kim Yong Ju and Director Li Hu Rak as its co-chairmen for the purpose of promoting the implementation of these points of agreement and, at the same time, improving and settling various problems between the north and south and solving the question of the country's reunification on the basis of the principles of the national reunification agreed upon.

7. Firmly believing that the points of agreement mentioned above conform to the unanimous desire of the whole nation which aspires after national reunification, feeling as if days are so many years, the two sides solemnly promise to the whole nation to honestly fulfil these points of agreement.

A GIANT STEP ON THE THORNY ROAD TO UNIFICATION

AN EDITORIAL COMMENT

"History moves on its inevitable course."

The joint statement of the North and South concerning the steps toward the goal of unification of Korea is without doubt a historic document. In a realistic sense, it is the beginning of a difficult task; yet by the same token it launches the people of Korea, North and South, on a course from which they will not be deterred. The spirit of the accord already attained the end for reconciliation between the artificially divided country of Korea. Why? Because the joint statement embodies the unyielding hope and aspiration of an artificially divided people to be one nation again.

After 27 years of division, it is almost as though the 50 million people of Korea have risen to cry: "Enough! We are brothers and sisters, and no demarcation line imposed by outside forces can any longer keep us apart." Their cry has been heard—and anticipated—by enlightened people throughout the world. For its part, the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center is proud and gratified to have had a role in enlightening the people of the United States as to the historical background and the realities of Korea today.

Lest there be any illusions about the rate of progress toward unification, it is clear that the most reactionary forces in South Korea, all of them huddled within and about the government of President Park Chung Hee, will do their utmost to hinder that progress. They will be abetted in their efforts by their counterparts in the governing and industrial establishments of the United States and Japan.

For example, on August 5, it was announced that an important set of talks between the Red Cross of North and South, scheduled for August 7, had been postponed, supposedly because of differences over the site of the conference, the participants, and the amount of news coverage. Since Pyongyang had indicated it would

not object to the first conference being held in Seoul (the site in any case would alternate between Seoul and Pyongyang), and had already agreed to the number of participants and a generous amount of coverage, the onus for the postponement clearly lay with Seoul.

In *The New York Times* of August 6, Richard Halloran reported from Seoul: "The delay has played into the hands of South Koreans who are hard-line anti-Communists and who oppose any contacts with the Pyongyang government of Premier Kim Il Sung." But even they could not prevail: the obstacles to the talks were removed a few days later.

When Major General F. M. Rogers last year left his post as senior member of the United Nations (read: United States) Command in Korea, he told a correspondent: "It is time for Koreans to talk to Koreans." Immediately his comment was disowned by Washington officials as not representative of the views of the United States government.

Nevertheless, high officials of North and South began to exchange secret visits to their respective capitals. Finally, on July 4, 1972, the two governments issued their joint statement—which may one day be recorded in history as a kind of Korean declaration of independence.

The agreement stipulates that unification be achieved by Koreans, without interference by other powers, and by peaceful means; that political and ideological differences not be allowed to forestall unity; that military provocation and mutual defamation should cease, and that a "hot line" be established between North and South. Future Red Cross discussions were to concentrate on ending the long separation of families by permitting exchange of visits and mail, and other means of communication.

Those are the first steps. The major factors working toward their achievement are:

- The continuing easing of tensions between the socialist and capitalist worlds; the imposition on the ruling class of the United States of a policy of peaceful coexistence by the peace forces of the world; the continued setbacks of United States aggression in Indochina; the growing political and military struggles of the national liberation movement; the sustained resistance of the people of the United States to the foreign and domestic policies of their government—all of these factors are swiftly changing the world balance of class forces in favor of the revolutionary forces of the world.
- The patient and continuing efforts for more than two decades toward unification by Kim Il Sung and his government.
- The increasing difficulties in which the government of Park

Chung Hee finds itself, despite the institution of a virtual police state—or perhaps because of it.

Although the media of the United States have been abysmally (and often deliberately) negligent in presenting news of the growing dissent and dissatisfaction in South Korea which led to the "emergency measures" of December 1971, it is a fact that ceaseless, open opposition has mounted. Following the announcement of the joint statement, the government in Seoul was forced to convene a special session of the National Assembly (practically defunct) to allow for debate on both the joint statement and the emergency measures.

As though to reassert his authority and as a warning to dissenters, Park Chung Hee executed four courageous opponents of his regime within days of the announcement of the joint statement, and imprisoned 25 others. The effect of this vindictiveness can only be to increase the anger of the people of the South and their determination to work even harder for national unity.

There have been some notable breakthroughs in reporting in the American establishment media about North Korea—for example, the interviews of Premier Kim Il Sung by Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* (recorded in full for the first time in the USA in this issue of *Korea Focus*) and by Selig Harrison of the *Washington Post.* But the obtuseness of the media which has done so much to obfuscate and distort the truth about Korea still persists.

On July 3, for example, the day before the joint statement was released, a *New York Times* editorial (do the editorial writers read the reports of their own correspondents?) described Premier Kim Il Sung's initiative toward unification as "a new honeyed approach," although the initiative had been apparent to all who would see for 25 years. Kim Il Sung's approach, the editorial said, very much resembled a "Trojan Horse device." But it would be "unjustified defeatism" to think that a renewal of contact "must necessarily redound to the advantage of the dictatorship [the North] as against a country [the South] which permits open debate and contested elections."

How open conditions are in the South was attested to by another *Times* correspondent in Seoul, Tilman Durdin, in an interview a few days later with Park Chung Hee's chief political opponent, Kim Dae Jung, who lives in a fortress-like home under constant surveillance. Kim Dae Jung described in detail how the opposition in South Korea has been stifled, and how Park Chung Hee was bent on achieving a self-perpetuating dictatorship.

(After the joint statement was announced, the *Times,* in a re-

freshing demonstration of journalistic lucidity, editorially described the accord as "a historic development of the utmost importance for improving the political atmosphere in Asia and the world.")

THE UNITED NATIONS

As the new events unfold on the Korean peninsula, the spotlight is now trained on another stage closer to home: the General Assembly of the United Nations. For years the United States, with various countries fronting for it, has frustrated a genuine debate on Korea, on the fraud of the "United Nations Command" there, and on the United Nations Commission for the Reunification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which goes by the indigestible name of UNCURK. For years attempts have been made to invite—without strings—a representative of the government at Pyongyang to participate in a debate on Korea. But these attempts have failed because of the insistence of the United States and its wards that Pyongyang accept the "competence and authority" of the United Nations in any resolution of the future of Korea.

Pyongyang has consistently refused to accede to this demand on the reasonable ground that it would be like giving an occupation force in Korea carte blanche in advance to dictate the terms of a peace settlement. Further, Pyongyang has insisted that Korea's future be determined by Koreans alone, without interference by an outside force. And so long as the United Nations provides for the 43,000 troops of the United States the "cover of its flag" in South Korea, the United Nations remains an outside force.

Once again, in 1972, a proposal has been made by thirteen countries led by Algeria, for a debate on Korea. But this time there is a major difference: the People's Republic of China is represented in the Assembly and, in fact, is one of the thirteen sponsors of the proposal. China was an active participant in repelling the reckless United States invasion of North Korea in 1951.

The Soviet Union has already placed on the 1972 agenda of the Assembly a proposal calling for the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea, and the dissolution of UNCURK. Moscow's position on Korea remains unchanged, but it is in constant contact with Pyongyang on the issue, and it is considered likely that it will give priority to the thirteen-nation proposal if that accords with Pyongyang's wishes.

The Algerian proposal calls for the "creation of favorable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." An accompanying memorandum does not demand specifically the removal of United States forces, but it does note that the

United Nations still gives the "cover of its flag" to these forces. The procedure would be something like this:

If the Algerian proposal is adopted, it would cut the ground out from under any further objections to all-Korean talks on unification because it would render obsolete the hypocritical resort to United Nations camouflage. Both Washington and Seoul are acutely aware of this eventuality, and the attempt in early August to stall the Red Cross talks evidently was made in the hope that Pyongyang would once again be forced to rebuff the United Nations, and Seoul's hand would be accordingly strengthened.

CHANGING TIMES

But the world of 1972 is different even from the world of 1971. President Nixon has traveled to Peking and to Moscow and, ironically, the journeys of this staunch anti-Communist have helped enormously to dispel the specter of the "international Communist conspiracy" which, according to Cold War mythology, propelled the war in Korea in June 1950. With both the Soviet Union and China firmly on the side of Korean unification, and with the war in Southeast Asia still a grim reality, a debate on Korea in the 1972 Assembly would take on immense significance. None of this is lost on any nation, big or small.

President Nixon's journeys must be seen as simultaneously (1) an acknowledgement of the continuing defeat of the aggressive, military policy of U.S. imperialism and anti-communism in Asia and elsewhere forcing them to retreat and maneuver, and (2) an effort to rescue U.S. captalism, plagued with a dollar crisis, inflation, unemployment, strikes, crime, and civil disobedience, by securing for it new markets in the socialist countries.

One cause and consequence of these journeys and this new effort at accommodation is a realignment of forces in eastern Asia. Japan, though still tied to the U.S. economically and dominated by powerful U.S. military bases on her land and by military aid, is becoming more powerful and independent, and is raising serious questions about such tie and domination. Japan appears ready to improve her relations with the Soviet Union, to abandon her connections with Taiwan, to normalize her relations with the People's Republic of China, to take a second look at the consequences of her business and military relations with South Korea, and to accelerate her trade and cultural relations with North Korea. In short, Japan, the main ally of the U.S. in eastern Asia, is being pulled away from the U.S. and toward her Asian neighbors.

How are we to explain this realignment of forces, from the times of the U.S. occupation of Japan and South Korea in 1945 to the fast-changing present? We must set down as some major events: the heroic resistance of the Korean people (aided by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) to American aggression in 1950-1953; the revolutionary fervor and solidarity of the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Laotians, and other Asians fighting against U.S. imperialism; the international unity of world-wide progressve forces in this struggle; the material support lent to these peoples by the Soviet Union and other socialist nations; the building of new socialist economies in the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam; the policy of peaceful coexistence and ideological struggle consistently pursued by the Soviet Union in its relations with the U.S., simultaneously aiming at reduction of chances of nuclear war and at militant ideological defense of socialism; and the inevitable break-up of capitalism, within countries, between countries, and on an international scale.

Now that the accord has established the foundation for reconciliation, now that both sides declare that there is no danger of armed conflict from either side for purpose of reconciliation and unification, the main reason given by the U.S. imperialists for the arming and continuing U.S. occupation of South Korea, now that this fraud has been demolished, we ask: Why do we need troops in South Korea?

ROLE OF AKFIC

Where does the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center come in to all this? If AKFIC may be permitted a little forwardness, it is *already* in. AKFIC arrived officially on the scene at a press conference on February 24, 1971. Represented among its hundred initiating sponsors were men and women of varying political and social philosophies, united by a hatred of war and a deep desire to establish the principle of the self-determination of all nations.

AKFIC presented itself as an anti-imperialist organization, American in character and tone, speaking for no foreign government, and rejecting anti-communism as a breeding ground of dissension and distrust. It is frankly partisan to the aspirations of the people of Korea to determine their own future, and particularly without the oppressive military and economic overlordship of the United States or Japan—countries of which Koreans have had, and still have, bitter experiences.

In its first published document, *Operation War Shift,* AKFIC

stated that one of its main goals was "to prevent a new holocaust which could take the lives of thousands of civilians and soldiers in Korea—and the lives of thousands of young Americans." It pledged to "exert utmost pressure" on the government in Washington to withdraw its troops, and all other military equipment, from South Korea, and to permit the people of Korea to determine their own future, develop their own resources, and to choose a form of government according to their own needs and desires.

To the best of its ability AKFIC has sought to adhere to these principles. It has published two editions totalling 35,000 copies of *Operation War Shift* (which have circulated throughout the world), undertaken the publication of *Korea Focus*, sponsored advertisements in newspapers, distributed thousands of circulars, shown Korean films, presented Korean cultural events, and participated in forums and discussions in many parts of the United States.

It pledges to continue to do its utmost to inform the American public about the facts of Korea—North and South.

A united Korea would be the thirteenth most populous country in the world. Its human and natural resources are incomparable. Strategically situated, in a world free of tensions it could serve as a link between China, Japan and the Soviet Union, commercially, culturally, and in many other ways. Yet for 27 years successive administrations in Washington have sought to prevent Korea from attaining its birthright, let alone from being allowed to take its rightful place in the world family of nations.

But time is running out for the imperialists. A Korean scholar now resident in the United States has forecast the future of Korea in eloquent terms. In an article on the Op Ed page of *The New York Times* of July 29, 1972, Joungwon Alexander Kim, a research fellow in East Asian legal studies at the Harvard Law School, wrote:

"The pressures of historical reality have made Korean unification a virtual necessity. Forty-three centuries of nationhood have made the Korean people completely homogeneous, while thirteen centuries under a highly centralized national political system have created a sense of national identity virtually unmatched by any other country in the modern international system. Every Korean sees unification as an inevitable movement in the course of history."

This is a message in letters of fire for the Establishments in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. If the proprietors of these Establishments are unable to read the message, they will pay a bitter price for their illiteracy.

Executive Board, A.K.F.I.C.
Editorial Board "Korea Focus"

Interview Between Kim Il Sung and Representatives of the New York Times

Following is the complete text, published for the first time in the United States, of the interview given on May 26, 1972, in Pyongyang, by Premier Kim Il Sung of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, to Harrison E. Salisbury and John M. Lee of The New York Times.

Excerpts of this interview were published on May 31 The New York Times.

The interview was held 21 days after Li Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency representing Park Chung Hee, conferred in Pyongyang with Kim Il Sung and Kim Yong Ju, Director of the Organizational Department of the Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee.

A second interview was granted by Kim Il Sung on June 21 to Selig M. Harrison of the Washington Post 20 days after Pak Sung Chul, Second Deputy Premier of the Democratic Peoples Republic of the Korean Cabinet returned from Seoul where he conferred with Park Chung Hee, President of South Korea.

This complete text was published in the Pyongyang Times.

Kim Il Sung exchanged greetings with the American reporters and asked them if they felt any inconvenience during their stay in our country.

Harrison Salisbury, Associate Editor of *The New York Times*, expressed thanks to Kim Il Sung for receiving them and said that since their arrival they had been given good care and did not feel any inconvenience.

Kim Il Sung said that he was told they had gained disagreeable impressions of the country learning that the people have very strong anti-U.S. imperialist feeling, and he asked them whether they had very unpleasant feelings.

Salisbury said that he was not displeased with the strong anti-U.S. feelings of the Korean people at all and he knew about the anti-American sentiments of the Korean people before his coming to Korea. He said that he was very glad to have an opportunity to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Why anti-U.S. feeling among Korean people

Kim Il Sung: I think you must have seen and felt yourselves in our country what sentiments the Korean people have towards the United States.

The Korean people do not have good sentiments toward the United States. Our people have very strong anti-U.S. sentiments. It seems that you Americans were unpleased to see the strong anti-U.S. sentiments of the Korean people.

It is natural that the Korean people have bad sentiments towards the United States. The U.S. imperialists are the aggressor who has all along invaded our country. Can a people have good sentiments toward the aggressor invading their country?

The sentiments of the Korean people toward the United States became worse particularly because they suffered too much damage at the hands of the U.S. imperialists during the past Fatherland Liberation War.

During the past Fatherland Liberation War, our people really suffered enormous damage due to the barbarous acts of aggression of the U.S. imperialists. I don't think there is any Korean who has not suffered a loss in the Fatherland Liberation War. All the Koreans suffered

this or that way; at least families, relatives or friends of all of us suffered.

In Pyongyang, for example, few houses were left and the whole city was completely reduced to ashes and tens of thousands of people were killed in cold blood by the indiscriminate bombing of the U.S. imperialists. The case was the same with Wonsan and Hamhung and other cities. Even our villages were all reduced to ashes in the last days of the war.

The Korean people who suffered such serious damage at the hands of U.S. imperialists cannot have good sentiments toward the United States.

Even after the ceasefire the United States has invariably adopted an unfriendly attitude towards our country.

'The Armistice Agreement stipulates for holding a political conference between the two sides soon after the ceasefire and solving the Korean question by peaceful means. But the United States did not keep its promise. As a result, our country is in a state of ceasefire today. No peace agreement has yet been concluded and there has been no progress in the work for solving the Korean question peacefully. Therefore, l always tell my people that our generations are changing, but the target of uor struggle remains the same.

The U.S. authorities have persisted in their aggressive acts against our country, violating the Armistice Agreement. Since the "Pueblo" incident, the United States has been continuing aerial reconnaissance of our country. One may say that owing to this our country is always in a de facto state of war.

As the de facto state of war has continued after the ceasefire we could not but step up defense upbuilding and direct huge funds to this. Frankly speaking, the enormous spending on defense upbuilding in the past period has affected the rise of the living standards of the people to a certain extent. Our people say the United States is entirely to blame for this, too.

Thus, our people have strong anti-U.S. sentiments because they suffered serious damage at the hands of the U.S. imperialists during the past Fatherland Liberation War and, moreover, have bad sentiments toward the United States because the U.S. imperialists have taken an unfriendly attitude towards our country and carried on their aggressive acts in violation of the Armistice Agreement after the war.

With the situation strained, we cannot but continue stepping up preparations for war. We do not conceal that we are making preparations for war. Who can tell whether the U.S. imperialists will not pounce upon our country again? No one, neither you nor I, can tell. So, we are now openly making preparations for war in order to defend the country from the enemy's aggression.

The most important thing in our preparations for war is to educate all the people to hate U.S. imperialism. Without educating the entire people in the hatred for U.S. imperialism, we cannot get the better of the U.S. imperialists who boast of their technical superiority.

We, therefore, are strengthening ideological education among the people to hate U.S. imperialism. It is, in my opinion, quite natural and the right thing to do, that we are educating the people to hate U.S. imperialism. We need not stop the anti-U.S. education which we have been giving to the people or conceal the fact that we are educating the people in the anti-U.S. idea just because you are coming to our country, need we?

You must understand the bad sentiments of our people towards the United States.

You have just said that you hope to see some change in this abnormal situation between our country and the United States. We hope the same. We have no intention of creating many enemies.

Now, I will answer some questions raised by you.

Regarding friendly relations between the U.S.A. and the DPRK.

To begin with, I would like to refer to the question of relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

You asked me what positive measures should be taken to end the abnormal state of relations between Korea and the United States. From our point of view it is a very simple question.

The relations between our country and the United States entirely depend on the attitude of the U.S. Government. If the U.S. Government changes its policy toward our country, we will do the same toward the United States.

If the U.S. Government wants to improve its

relations with our country, it must, first of all, stop interfering in the internal affairs of our country so that the question of Korea's reunification be settled independently by the Koreans themselves. Now nearly 20 years have passed since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in our country and what kind of necessity is there for stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea under the signboard of the "United Nations forces"? Some people say the U.S. troops still remain in South Korea to protect it in fear of our possible "invasion of the south." But this is a lie. We have declared time and again that we have no intention at all of "invading the south." It is high time an end was put to the role of police played by the U.S. troops in South Korea under the signboard of the "United Nations forces."

Why the U.S. Government does displease us is not only the stationing of its troops in South Korea but its helping the revival of Japanese militarism. We are not pleased with the United States helping the revival of Japanese militarism. The joint communiqué between Nixon and Sato released in 1969 indicates that the United States is bringing Japanese militarism into South Korea so as to replace it in the Korean aggression and instigating the latter to interfere in the domestic affairs of our country. After the announcement of the joint communiqué Sato openly claimed he would interfere in the internal affairs of Korea. This is also an unfriendly attitude of the U.S. Government toward our country.

As regards the question of the United Nations the U.S. Government is taking an unwarranted attitude toward our country. The U.S. Government attaches conditions to inviting us to the United Nations while advocating the invitation of South Korea to the United Nations without any condition. They allege that we do not respect the United Nations Charter, but we have neither violated nor ignored the United Nations Charter. The United States insists that it would let us attend the United Nations General Assembly when we recognize the illegal resolutions on the Korean question which have been adopted at the United Nations. How can we go to the U.N. General Assembly under this precondition? The United States is also instigating the "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" to make annual reports full of lies and falsifications against our country and make unfriendly false propaganda against us.

As the U.S. Government has invariably pursued an unfriendly policy toward our country, there has been no inprovement in the relations between Korea and the United States and a big obstacle lies in the reunification of our country.

If the United States wants to improve its relations with our country, it should stop interfering in the internal affairs of our country, withdraw the U.S. troops going under the signboard of "U.N. forces" and dissolve the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," so that the Koreans can reunify their country independently. It should not encourage the split of the Korean nation but support the reunion of our nation. If the United States continues to commit acts of dividing our country, no improvements can be expected of our attitude toward the United States. The Korean peninsula is now cut into parts. If the U.S. troops pull out of South Korea and there is no more interference by outside forces, it will be possible to seek common points for the reunification of the country by Koreans themselves. And, if the U.S. troops quit South Korea, I think Koreans will come to terms easily and the anti-U.S. sentiments of our people will be dispelled gradually.

When U.S. President Nixon visited China he said while looking at the Great Wall of China that the barriers dividing countries should be pulled down. If the U.S. Government wants to put these words into practice, it must begin with Korea. Now Nixon says that he is going to improve relations with China and do the same with the Soviet Union. Then why should it continue to keep its military bases in South Korea? In the past the United States argued that it keeps its military bases in South Korea for the purpose of preventing the expansion of communism. Now that the United States is going to have good relations with big socialist countries, there is no exuse for it to keep military bases continuously in South Korea, I think. So the United States must quit South Korea at an early date, dismantling all its military bases and taking aggressor troops along.

If the United States wants to improve its relations with our country, it should also stop helping the revival of Japanese militarism and

bringing it into South Korea. It is an unfriendly act hostile to our people for the United States to try to put up the Japanese militarists as its agents to invade South Korea in its place and reduce South Korea to a commodity market and appendage of Japan. The .S. Government should discontinue these unfriendly acts against our country.

If the U.S. Government gives up its unfriendly acts against our country and stops obstructing the reunification of our country, there is no reason why we should be hostile to the United States. So we say that the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States entirely depend on the attitude of the U.S. Government, not on us. We will watch what policy the United States will adopt toward our country in the future.

The U.S. Government should improve relations not only with big countries, but with small countries as well. The improvement of relations with big countries by the United States will not greatly influence its relations with small countries, we think. But the U.S. Government has not yet changed its former attitude in its relations with small countries.

In the joint communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the United States, the latter declared that it supports the relaxation of tension in the Korean peninsula and the contact between South Korea and North Korea. As regards this, it remains to be seen what influence the United States will have on South Korea. If the United States does not support the relaxation of tension in Korea and north-south contacts in the future, this will imply that it uttered empty talk under pressure.

Our people remember the words spoken by Nixon during his visit to China. What interests me most in his words in China is that no barriers should split the world people. We are watching how Nixon will put his words into practice.

You asked me if there can be moves to promote mutual understanding and reduce tension between the two countries before the U.S. troops are withdrawn from South Korea, that is, by exchanges of journalists and cultural groups and so on. I will answer this briefly.

To speak frankly, I wonder what interest Americans have in wanting to come to our country. I don't think our people will bring anything interesting, if they go to the United States under the present situation.

This does not mean we want to shut the door in our relations with the United States. But I consider that so long as the basic problem between the two countries remains unsolved, exchanges of journalists or cultural interchange are of little significance.

I was told that you felt unpleasant in our country. If other Americans come to our country in the future, they will all go back with unpleasant feelings.

We are now strengthening anti-U.S. education among the younger generation so it may not forget the enemy. So long as the hostile policy of the U.S. Government toward our country remains unchanged our policy toward the United States will not change either. Therefore, Americans will not get good impressions in our country unless the basic problem between the two countries is solved. If many Americans come to our country and go back with unpleasant feelings in the future, no one will benefit by it, I think.

If the U.S. Government changes its hostile policy toward our country, we may mitigate our anti-U.S. sentiments. Only then will the visits and intercourse between the two countries be beneficial and interesting to both sides.

While the U.S. Government makes no change in its hostile policy toward our country, I favour mutual visits between us just on a limited scale, as at present. We do not think that there is no necessity at all for our journalists to visit the United States. In my opinion, it is necessary for our journalists to go to the United States in order to let the American people hear our just voice, considering that now you are listening only to the voice of the South Korean ruling circles. And we welcome American journalists and democratic figures visiting our country on a limited scale. These visits and intercourse will help promote understanding between the two peoples.

From our present experience with you, I think if Americans come to our country next time we should give them a lecture on how we are conducting anti-U.S. education among the people of our country before they begin inspection.

Kim Il Sung grants an interview to Harrison E. Salisbury of *The New York Times* and John M. Lee, the paper's Tokyo Bureau chief.

Korean Unification

Next, I will refer to some points of the question of Korea's reunification.

You asked me whether there is any possibility that a 1954 Geneva type conference, as is the case with the Vietnam question, would be helpful in solving the Korean question. In my opinion, we don't need any such thing for settling the Korean problem.

The Korean question should be solved by the Koreans themselves on the principle of national self-determination without interference of any outside forces. Only then can the reunification of our country be achieved peacefully.

The Soviet Union and China actively support this programme of ours for national reunification. The Soviet and Chinese Governments issued statemnets many times supporting the programme for the peaceful reunification of our country.

For the independent settlement of the question of Korea's reunification without interference of outside forces the U.S. troops must be withdrawn from South Korea first of all. Even if they are withdrawn, no war will break out in Korea.

If the U.S. troops pull out of South Korea and the entire people of North and South Korea unite, the reunification of Korea will be attained early and the moves of the Japanese militarists to invade Korea again will be checked. The Korean people can achieve national unity by their own efforts.

As you know, we are now having contacts with South Korea through the preliminary talks between the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations. Of course, we have to wait and see what will be the prospect of these talks and what will become of it. But we think that if Koreans sit down together, they can seek ways of removing the distrust and misunderstanding between the north and south and attaining the national unity.

It is because the North and South Koreans failed to sit together in one place that they have frozen sentiments, distrust and misunderstanding in many respects.

We think there are distrust and misunderstanding between the North and South Koreans in some questions.

For our part, we think that the South Korean rulers may invade the northern half of the Republic with the backing of the United States and the Japanese militarist forces. And the South Korean rulers misunderstand us, thinking we might attack South Korea. They are raising "anti-communist" clamors, asserting that we are trying to "communize" South Korea. Owing to such distrust and misunderstanding no progress has yet been made in the question of Korea's reunification.

We believe that if we Koreans sit together, we can remove distrust and mutual misunderstanding and find common points and, on this basis, achieve national unity.

The South Korean rulers are talking about the independent reunification of the country advocating, though in words only, "self-help," "self-sustenance," "self-defense" and if we interpret this in good sense, we can find some points similar to a certain extent to the idea of independence, self-sustenance and self-defence which we advocate. If we find these common points one by one and develop them, it would be possible to reach an agreement on achieving national unity.

The difference of systems between the north and south must not be an obstacle to the promotion of national unity and the attainment of national unification.

These days some foreign journalists write there are two opposite poles in Korea. One is North Korea's communist system and the other South Korea's capitalist system and these two poles cannot meet each other. They say if these two poles meet each other, a war will break out again in Korea.

We do not see South Korea as a complete capitalist society. We do not think there are any big monopoly capitalists in South Korea. If any, they are only a few comprador capitalists. Of course, we are against comprador capitalists. We oppose them because they obstruct the development of the national economy. But, we are not against national capitalists and medium and small entrepreneurs. We can say South Korean society is no more than a society which is just starting to take the road of capitalism, or is just attracted by capitalism or is being infiltrated by capitalism or worshipping capitalism or something like that. This does not mean that there is no difference of systems between the north and south.

It is true that there are now differences of ideals and beliefs between the north and south. But, we think we must transcend these differences for the sake of national unity. We have no intention to impose our socialist system on South Korea. If the present rulers of South Korea do not force us to change our socialist system for another social system, there can be no reason why we do not achieve national unity.

If the north and south establish the principle of not imposing their social systems on the other, then there is no need of fighting each other by force of arms.

If neither of the two sides is forced to give up their political faith, is there any reason for the people of one and the same nation to fight each other?

It is possible that a country may have various political systems and people who have different kinds of beliefs yet live together in one country. What kind of political system there should be in South Korea should be decided by the South Korean people themselves. So we think that even after national reunification the present social systems of the north and south may still exist as they are and people who have different beliefs may live together in Korea. Here mutual trust and respect are necessary.

We always hold that our Fatherland should be reunified independently and peacefully without any interference of outside forces. And we hold that national unity should be achieved under conditions of mutual trust and respect despite the difference of systems between the north and south.

In my speech of August 6 last year, I said we are ready to hold talks even with the Democratic Republican Party, the ruling party of South Korea. This also stemmed from our intention to work for mutual respect.

If the north and south join strength and make tireless efforts, we will be able to gradually eliminate mutual misunderstanding and distrust and achieve the reunification of the country independently on a democratic basis. The reunification of our country cannot be achieved with the interference of outside forces in the Korean question. Foreigners cannot remove the distrust and misunderstanding among our nation. There

fore, we oppose the interference of any outside forces in the Korean question.

We think if there is no interference of outside forces in the Korean question and foreign countries give up obstructive machinations in the future, the reunification of Korea will surely be achieved in accordance with our maintenance though it may need time.

Practical Measures for Reunification

You said you want to know what practical measures we are taking for the independent, peaceful reunification of the Fatherland. I will give you a short account of them.

We advocate mail exchange and mutual visits, trade and economic cooperation as well between the north and south.

We think mutual visits between our Deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly and "national assemblymen" of South Korea are also a good thing in realizing exchange of personages. If "national assemblymen" of South Korea come to the northern half of the Republic and our Deputies to the Supreme People's Assembly go to South Korea and sit together and exchange views open-heartedly through such mutual visits, it will be a good thing, not a bad thing, for the reunification of the Fatherland. We call for contacts not only with "national assemblymen" of South Korea but also with personages of broad circles, political and public, in South Korea. In other words, we hold that all the political parties and public organizations of North and South Korea should sit together for a political consultative conference and exchange a wide range of views on the question of national reunification.

We also proposed that a confederation be enforced if it's impossible to reunify the country right now. The confederation we propose means forming a supreme national council with representatives of the governments of North and South Korea mainly for the purpose of jointly consulting about questions for the national interests of Korea and coordinating them in a uniform way, while maintaining the present different political systems of North and South Korea as they are for the time being.

We also proposed many a time to conduct economic intercourse between the north and south, proceeding from the immediate interests of the nation. If economic cooperation is realized between North and South Korea and we give South Korea what we have in sufficiency and take from it what it has in plenty, the economy of North and South Korea can be developed faster.

We have also proposed an exchange of culture and science between the north and south.

We also propose to conclude between the north and south a peace agreement on refraining from use of arms against the other, propose the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the reduction of the numerical strength of armed forces of the two sides. The arms race between the north and south today is affecting the life of the people in no small measure.

We are making all possible efforts to remove the tension and realize contacts and exchange between the north and south. Of course, if mutual travel between the north and south is realized capitalist influence may come into the northern half of the Republic. But we are not afraid of it in the least. We keep our door open so that South Koreans can visit the northern half of the Republic at any time. Now it is not us but the South Korean rulers who have closed the door. All questions will be solved easily if the South Korean authorities open the door.

But the South Korean rulers are very afraid of opening the door. While attending the preliminary talks between the Red Cross organizations of North and South Korea, they are playing every kind of trick after declaring a so-called "state of emergency" under the fictitious pretext of "threat of southward aggression from the north." They are ruthlessly suppressing the South Korean people aspiring after the reunification of the Fatherland. Even "national assemblymen" from the Democratic Republican Party and "national assemblymen" from the New Democratic Party are not allowed to talk among themselves in the puppet national assembly. The South Korean rulers are now kicking up an "anti-communist" racket, holding "anti-communist meetings" and "anti-communist, anti-espinage meetings" in all parts of South Korea.

We have no intention to invade South Korea. We do not want to impose the socialist system upon South Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean rulers declared the so-called "state of emergency" under the pretext of "threat of

southward aggression from the north" and are intensifying the fascist repression of the South Korean people and clamoring about "reunification by prevailing over communism." This is not an attitude to be taken for national reunification. Such racket of theirs is designed not to make closer the relations between the north and south but to further estrange them from each other; it is an act intended to obstruct the reunification of the country. By advocating "reunification by prevailing over communism," the South Korean rulers mean to achieve reunification after wiping out the communists in Korea. This, in the final analysis, means opposing the reunification of the country and perpetuating the division. I do not know who are the authors of this racket in South Korea. But I think this exposes their weak points.

We will continue to make patient efforts in the future to realize contacts and dialogue between the north and south.

We have much apprehension about the fact that South Korea is being subjected to Japan economically. If the South Korean rulers continuously keep the door shut between the north and south, then Japanese capital will come into South Korea and South Korea will be completely subjected to Japan economically.

We do not forget the history of Japanese imperialists' invasion of our country. The Japanese imperialists began invading Korea in 1894 under the pretext of "protecting" Japanese residents in Korea. From that time on our country began to be transformed into a Japanese colony.

Japanese militarism, revived under the wings of U.S. imperialism, is now scheming to invade Korea again. We read an article in the Japanese magazine "World Weekly" quoting the bosses of Japanese militarism as saying Korea should not be reunified for at least a quarter of a century. This means the Japanese militarists are watching for a chance to invade Korea again.

We cannot but heighten vigilance against the Japanese militarists. We let the entire people and younger generation clearly know the history of aggression of our country by the Japanese militarists, so that they may not forget this history and keep heightened vigilance against Japanese militarism.

It is due to the obstruction of outside forces to the reunification of our country, along with the reactionary manoeuvres of the South Korean rulers, that our country has not yet been reunified, separated into the north and south.

Therefore, we think that the entire people of North and South Korea must firmly unite to wage an active struggle against outside forces hampering the reunification of our country.

Korean-Japanese Relations

You asked me about the question of relations between our country and Japan. Now I am going to speak of this briefly.

Whether or not the relations between our country and Japan will be improved depends on what attitude the Japanese Government will take.

The good-neighbor relations between Korea and Japan have not been established up to this date entirely because the Japanese Government has enforced hostile policy toward our country. The successive Cabinets of the Japanese Government from Yoshida, Kishi and Ikeda to Sato have adopted an unfriendly attitude toward our country and adopted hostile policies.

If the Japanese Government wants to give up the hostile policies toward our country and establish friendly relations with us, we are fully ready to respond to it.

But we do not want to improve the relations between the two countries through a mendicant diplomacy under the condition that the Japanese Government continues to pursue the hostile policy and take an unfriendly attitude toward our country. The smaller a country is, the greater self-respect its people must have. Without even self-respect the people of small countries cannot live on. We do not want to go to "heaven" in such a way as to show the right cheek when we are hit on the left cheek. We have no idea of giving up our self-respect.

A Gift for Koreans

If I had to reply to your question what is the greatest gift I would bequeath to our people, it is the reunification of the Fatherland.

The Korean nation is a single nation of one and the same blood but is not yet reunified, which is why our nation lives divided. We feel

very sorry for it.

Now by an artificial barrier in our country no small number of people live long separated from their families and relatives, not meeting each other, nor having postal exchange nor knowing each other's life and death. The artificial barrier causing such tragic plight must be pulled down as early as possible and our fatherland must not fail to be reunified.

If our country is reunified, our nation will live as well as others and will live peacefully with the peoples of various countries of the world on the principles of equality and mutual respect.

The Korean people are an industrious and resourceful people from olden times. Our people suffered a lot and were subjected to national humiliation, oppression and exploitation for a long time and to the aggression of foreign invaders. So, if the people of North and South Korea join efforts and fight for the building of a new society, our people can live as well as others and our country can be a rich and powerful independent state.

Our country has no small population and is abundant in natural resources. We have brought up lots of competent national cadres. Immediately after the liberation we had few able technicians. The Japanese imperialists did not allow Koreans to learn technology and also prevented them from learning technology. The Japanese imperialists were too cruel to allow Koreans to learn technology. Only four locomotive drivers were found among Koreans before the liberation. They allowed only Japanese to be locomotive drivers and made Koreans shovel coal. In order not to repeat such bitter experience, we directed deep attention to bringing up national cadres after the liberation. So today we have over 500,000 technicians and specialists. On the basis of the successes already made in training cadres, we plan to increase their number to one million in the period of the Six-Year Plan.

We have a big population, rich resources and a large contingent of technicians. So, when the country is reunified, we can make our people live well and build the country rich and powerful in a short time.

I will give a brief answer to your question what were the most difficult struggles of our life.

We had many difficult struggles in the past. I cannot count all of them now.

If I had to name one of the most difficult struggles we waged in the past, it was the struggle for rising up on debris after the war.

Owing to the three-year war, the towns and villages of our country were completely razed to the ground and industrial establishments all reduced to ashes. After the war we had to build towns and villages, construct factories on debris where nothing was left and rapidly stabilize the people's livelihood. But we could overcome these difficulties and trials and win a great victory in the economic construction as we were firmly united with the masses of the people.

We have basically overcome the difficulties in the socialist construction. Now the living of our people has been stabilized. Of course, the living standards of our people are not yet so high. But no one is going in rags and hungry and no one is wandering about without an occupation in our country. Our people all work, receive free education and enjoy free medical treatment. This is a great victory won by our people in the socialist construction.

We have created a basis for rapidly developing the national economy and raising the people's living to a higher level in the future.

As I already mentioned above, we have a large contingent of competent national cadres, laid the basis of a powerful heavy industry with the engineering industry as the core and constructed a large number of modern light industry factories. Especially, we have developed the industry of our country into a firm, independent industry relying on our own raw materials. We have laid down a basis for further developing stock breeding.

All this is a firm guarantee for more rapidly developing the economy of our country and raising the people's living to a higher level.

Thank you for your attention. May I conclude my answers to your questions?

We oppose the reactionary policy of the U.S. Government. But we do not oppose the U.S. people. We want to have many good friends in the United States.

South Koreans read Seoul reports of talks with North Korea.

Reactions to the North-South Korean Negotiations

New York Times—July 5, "This week's accord between South and North Korea is an historic development of the utmost importance for improving the political atmosphere in Asia and the world. Welcomed and important as is this first step toward rapprochement it does not solve all problems or end all dangers on the Korean Peninsula. This major advance must be seen as a direct consequence of the improvement of the general world political situation. . . ."

Daily World—July 8, "Koreans stress own work for unification, the joint statement's text makes it clear that reunification is to be decided solely by Koreans. The U.S. fought the 1950-53 Korean war under the fig leaf cover

of the U.N. and still maintains 43,000 troops in South Korea supposedly under the 'United Nation Military Command.' Obviously, there is no room on the Korean Peninsula now for the 'U.N.' or the 'U.S.'

Scripps Howard Press—July 5, ". . . . it's better to have the halves of Korea negotiating, building, and communicating than arming to the teeth and preparing for another war."

Washington Star—July 5, "A boon for the American taxpayer could be the speedier arrival of the day when it will not be necessary to keep 40,000 U.S. troops along the Korean ceasefire line. The de-escalation to the hostility in Korea should give Americans reason for more general reflection about involving our force in foreign wars. Generations to come may wonder about the outpouring of blood that did not settle these fratricidal (U.S. invasion—*Korea Focus* editorial board) affairs in the Far East."

Guardian—July 19, "The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea has won a profoundly important diplomatic and political victory. The agreement on principles that may lead towards reunification of Korea, announced July 4th by the Pyongyang and Seoul governments, is just what the DPRK has been seeking for nearly two decades. And it has been just what successive U.S. controlled dictatorships in South Korea have done their best to avoid ever since Korea was 'temporarily' divided at the 38th parallel following World War II. The seven-point agreement and the secret North-South meetings which preceded it do not mean an end to the split between North and South Korea will take place immediately.

Baltimore Sun—July 6, "The break-through agreement by North and South Korea to pursue national reunification through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference, is a message to the world. . . ." (In the first place U.S. imperialism is to get out of Korea, lock, stock and barrel and to allow the Koreans to reassert their common national interest—*Korea Focus* editorail board).

Daily World—July 9, From a statement issued by the Central Committee, Communist Party U.S.A. "The announcement made by the representative of the DPRK and the government of South Korea (July 4th communique) . . . is a significant event full of high promises. Under Washington's command tens of thousands of South Korean troops have gone to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as mercenaries of U.S. imperialism's war of aggression against the peoples of Indochina. The fulfillment of the hopes raised by the 'Joint Communiqué of the North and South' requires agreement to withdraw all Korean armed forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It must also result in the earliest withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from South Koreea and the liquidation of U.S. arsenals and air bases now being used for its genocidal war and destruction against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and all Indochina. The successful solution of the question of Korean unification will constitute an important contribution to the cause of world peace and the national freedom of peoples."

United Nation's Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said in Geneva, Switzerland on July 5, that he approved of the joint statement (July 4th Communiqué) and that he spoke earlier with DPRK representatives. "I am happy to see that their hopes have now been realized," Waldheim said.

Cuba, USSR and Czechoslovakia: In a communique issued by Government and Communist Party Leaders of Cuba and U.S.S.R. and Cuba and Czechoslovakia, on the occasion of Fidel Castro's visit to the above two countries, they expressed "fraternal solidarity with the Korean Democratic Peoples Republic which is building socialism and we fully support the proposal of the DPRK government for the peaceful, democratic unification of the country and the demands of the Korean people for withdrawal of foreign troops from the South of Korea."

Peoples Korea (English weekly published in Tokyo by Korean residents in Japan) "The joint statement, announced on July 4th at the end of a series of North-South high-level talks, wholly incorporates the three principles of Korean unification as set forth by Marshal Kim Il Sung, the principles of independent and peaceful reunification and great national unity. The publication of the joint statement constitutes an epochal event which meets the strong desire of the Korean nation for reunification."

Jenminh Jih Pao—July 9, Peking: "direct talks between North and South Korea without interference by outside forces can achieve progress in promoting the reunification of the fatherland."

Pyongyang Times—July 6, (English weekly published in the DPRK) "The north-south high-level talks and its results mark a really epochal event which makes a breach for the country's peaceful reunification. These talks are a great victory of our people. The talks have substantially opened up the possibility of easing tension in our country, restoring the national ties severed for a long time, reviving an atmosphere of national reconciliation and stepping up the country's independent peaceful reunification in every way. The imperialists and the reactionaries at home and abroad will hamper the cause of the Korean people for reunification in every way. The imperialists and the international reactionaries may support peace in Korea and its peaceful reunification in word, but in deed they will continuously and viciously maneuver to perpetuate the split of Korea. . . We do not want to, and cannot, live separated from each other. Never have we thought of the continued division of the nation and territory. Korea's reunification is not only the demand of our nation but also the demand of the times."

Han Duk Su—Chairman of the Central Standing Committee of Chongryun (the General Association of Korean residents in Japan) declared on July 4th following the announcement of North and South Joint Communiqué: "The holding of the north-south high-level talks and the publication of the joint statement of the north and the south are a brilliant victory for the program of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the DPRK for independent, peaceful reunification as advanced by Marshal Kim Il Sung. I, in the name of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan and all the 600,000 Korean nationals in this country, fully support the high-level meetings of the north and south and the joint statement completely agreed upon at the talks. Incorporated into the joint statement are the measures agreed upon between the two sides, to be taken in order to dispel misunderstanding and distrust between the north and south and reduce tension between the two and promote national reunification, with the common desire to see an earliest independent, peaceful national reunification.

A message to South Korean President Park Chung Hee from Yongjeung Kim, President, Korean Affairs Institute, Washington, D.C., (Representative Korean Residents in the U.S.A.):

"The reconciliation agreement between the north and south is the fulfillment of a long desired step toward the reunification of our indivisible nation. This happy tiding gives our people new hope for freedom, independence and prosperity.

"An identical message is being sent to Premier Kim Il Sung of North Korea.

"Please accept the expressions of my highest esteem."

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From the Bulgarian Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian Peoples: "The Bulgarian people welcome the agreement reached at the north-south talks and express solidarity with the brotherly Korean people in their struggle for the country's peaceful reunification and prosperity."

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Makoto Ichikawa, Chairman of the General Council of Japan Trade Unions: "It is indeed an epoch-making event of historic significance, I think. This is the brilliant fruition of the line of the independent peaceful reunification of the country set forth by Premier Kim Il Sung."

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Masaharu Hatanaka, Representative Director of Japan-Korea Association: "The current developments patently show how reasonable it is, the line of independent peaceful national reunification followed by the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK Government."

Wall Street Journal—July 7, "given Korea's ideological and physical development over the last quarter century, unification sounds like an overly ambitious goal." (Not if U.S. troops get out from South Korea—*Korea Focus* editorial board).

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British writer Ian Macdonald: "The USA has now become shaky in position. In other words, the 'UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea' is bound to be dissolved. The tricky farce—the occupation of South Korea by the 'UN forces' has been fully exposed. This leaves no pretext for the U.S. Army to stay on in South Korea."

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Egyptian publication Al Ahbar: "This statement marks a historic turning point for Korea's peaceful reunification."

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Voice of the Korean People, No. 8, August 1972 (a Korean English-language periodical published for Korean-U.S.A. residents): "On July 4, Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced that they would seek peaceful reunification of Korea. Good! We have sent commendatory messages to Premier Kim Il Sung and President Park Chung Hee, pledging our support for speedy realization of the goal. That it took a quarter century for us to at last agree to unify our nation peacefully has been due to the suppression of the voice of the people. Last December the government (Seoul) discarded any pretense of democracy by imposing 'emergency laws' on the people. Its argument was that they were necessary in order to gird the nation against the threat of 'imminent military aggression' from the north. Now that the 'threat' is over, is there any reason for further delay in rescinding the rule by decree? The government still insists on perpetuating the rule by decree on grounds that it is necessary for national unity. This is being absurd, for the suppression breeds discontent and disunity in the nation. It is difficult to see what Seoul seeks to gain by opposing Pyongyang's entry in the UN as an observer. Koreans desire reunification and UN membership for their country. We believe that an observer status for both Seoul and Pyongyang this year will prove the chance for Korea's eventual membership at the world organization."

Poughkeepsie Journal, Friday, July 7: "The former South Korean ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Channing Liem, has hailed the recent rapprochement between North and South Korea as a 'historic and long step towards peace in Asia.' In telegrams to President Park Chung Hee of South Korea and Premier Kim II Sung of North Korea, Liem, who is currently a Professor of Political Science at the State University College of New Paltz, praised the re-unification agreement stating that: 'the whole world as well as Koreans, are heartened as it means a realization of a quarter century's dream of unification, freedom and prosperity for Koreans and a long step towards peace in Asia for war-weary peoples everywhere. I join all patriotic Koreans in pledging my support. Koreans cherish their personal as well as national freedom and they will support any government which works for the reunification of their country and the freedom and prosperity of the people."

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Nepszabadsag, organ of the C.C. of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: "The north-south joint statement owes entirely to the persevering stand held by DPRK for peaceful reunification. The continued occupation of south Korea by the aggression army of the U.S. imperialists and their interference in the internal affairs of Korea necessitate an intensified struggle for rejecting foreign interference."

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Rude Pravo, organ of C.C. of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, July 5: "The occupation of South Korea by the U.S. imperialists' army of aggression and their military 'aid' to South Korean rulers constitute the main obstacle to national reunification. The presence of the U.S. troops in South Korea directly conflicts with the agreed principles of achieving peaceful national reunification, step by step, free from pressure or interference of outside forces."

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Al Gumhuria, Egyptian Publication: "The publication of the north-south joint statement is a great victory of the progressive Korean people regarding the national reunification as the loftiest and greatest task to be settled in their generation."

Excerpts of Press Conference Held by Pak Sung Chul

Pak Sung Chul, Second Vice-Premier of the Cabinet met reporters on July 4, at the Taedonggang Hall in connection with the simultaneous publication in Pyongyang and Seoul on that day of the joint statement of the north and the south.

Present at the press conference were reporters of Rodong Sinmun, the Korean Central News Agency, the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee, Minju Choson, Pyongyang Sinmun, Choguk Tongil and other home press organs.

Foreign newsmen and press attaches of foreign embassies in Pyongyang were also present.

At the press conference Pak Sung Chul read the full text of the joint statement of the north and the south and showed to the newsmen the original text of the statement signed by the two sides.

Excerpts of Pak Sung Chul's Statement Follow:

An agreement has been reached between us and the South Korean side on a number of questions for promoting the independent, peaceful reunification of the country, and today we have announced it in the form of the joint statement of the north and the south.

This is a great historic event which puts an end to the 27-year-long split and antagonism of the north and the south and heralds the dawn of reunification to our people.

This important news will cause a great sensation at home and abroad, and will throw the entire Korean people ardently desirous of national reunification into a whirl of immense joy and excitement.

There have been a series of contacts and talks between the two sides before the north-south joint statement was signed and made public.

As you know well, the talks between the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations opened at Panmunjon in August last year at a time when the trend towards peaceful reunification rose rapidly in the northern and southern halves of our country and strong sentiments for detente and negotiations mounted in the international arena. Afterwards, we and the South Korean side, proceeding from the desire to accelerate the independent, peaceful reunification of the country, agreed with each other on holding high-level talks between the north and south, besides the Red Cross talks.

In order to prepare for the high-level talks, unofficial contacts of liaison delegates from the north and the south were realized in November last year and they visited Pyongyang and Seoul.

Through this course, the north-south high-level talks were held for the first time early last May.

Namely, at the invitation of Kim Yong Ju, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Director of its Organizational Guidance Department, Li Hu Rak, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, visited Pyongyang in the period from May 2 to 5 and held talks with Kim Yong Ju.

Kim Il Sung, received Li Hu Rak on May 3 and met him again on May 4 and had a cordial talk with him.

Following the talks in Pyongyang we visited Seoul in the period from May 29 to June 1, had talks with Li Hu Rak, and met Pak Jung Hi and had an open-hearted talk with him.

At the high-level talks held in Pyongyang and Seoul, the two sides exchanged open-hearted opinions, thawing each other's frozen feelings and, in this course, they reached an agreement on a number of questions for promoting mutual understanding and accelerating the country's reunification.

As is pointed out in Article 1 of the joint statement of the north and the south, the two

Press conference held in Taedonggang Hall in Pyongyang attended by North Korean reporters and representatives of the international press at which the North-South joint statement was announced.

sides reached a complete unanimity of opinions, first of all, on the three principles of national reunification set forth by Kim Il Sung, and on this basis, they also reached an agreement on a number of questions requiring concrete steps including the questions of refraining from slandering and vilifying the other side, of preventing military conflicts, the question affecting many-sided interchange between the north and the south in all the political, military, economic and cultural fields, and the question of forming and operating a North-South Coordination Committee as a permanent consultative body.

Today we have issued the north-south joint statement in order to reaffirm the common aspiration and resolve of both sides to achieve the independent, peaceful reunification of the country, assure each other of the joint efforts for its realization and further consolidate and develop the success already gained at the north-south high-level talks, by making public the foregoing agreed provisions.

Its significance lies, first of all, in the fact that with the agreement of the north and south Korean sides on the three principles of the country's reunification, solid groundwork and preconditions have been created for achieving the independent, peaceful reunification of the country.

The most important question in solving the question of national reunification in conformity with the will and interests of our people is to settle the affairs of our country by us Koreans on our own on the principle of national self-determination, rejecting outside forces.

The question of reunification can by no means be solved by the outside forces. As the stark historical facts prove, the division of our country into the north and the south was due to the outside forces; it is also due to splitting policy of the outside forces that we have failed to achieve the reunification up to date. It is quite obvious that our country divided by the outside forces cannot be reunified by the outside forces.

The three principles of national reunification stipulated in the north-south joint statement are the solely correct guiding principles showing a just solution to the question of reunification, a banner of patriotism encouraging our nation to a great national unity and a bright beacon giving the entire people of North and South Korea rays of hope for reunification.

It can be said that the agreement on these principles between the two sides of the north and the south has provided the most reliable guarantee for settling the question of national reunification by the efforts of the Korean people

themselves in conformity with their will and interests and that it is the first excellent step toward achieving national reunification with the united efforts of the north and the south.

Enemies of Reunification:

The joint statement of the north and the south is a powerful blow to those who try to obstruct Korea's reunification and perpetuate its division, going against the current of history.

Now, it is clear that none of the outside forces can find any excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of our nation.

Now that there exists no "threat of aggression" on South Korea "from the north," nor is there any need of "protection," and our nation is settling its internal problems according to its own faith, the U.S. imperialists must no longer meddle in the domestic affairs of our country; they must withdraw at once, taking with them all their forces of aggression.

As for the Japanese militarists, too, it is high time they changed their attitude toward our country.

The Japanese militarists should not worm their way into South Korea in an attempt to keep our country divided forever, but must desist from their scheme for reinvasion of South Korea and give up their hostile policy toward our Republic.

Historic Struggles of DPRK Leadership For Reunification:

Always paying the deepest attention to the reunification problem since the first days of the country's division, Kim Il Sung has repeatedly clarified the line of attaining the country's reunfication, not in all cases by reliance upon the outside forces but by the efforts of the Koreans themselves, not by means of war but by peaceful means, and has exerted all his efforts for its realization.

Notably, in his historic speech made on August 6 last year, he manifested a generous stand by expressing the readiness to have contacts at any time with all the political parties including the Democratic Republican Party and social organizations and individual personages of South Korea, which is a new national salvation measure for the attainment of the peaceful reunification of the country.

The talks between the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations now under way at Panmunjon was its first fruit.

Scientifically analyzing the trend of the situation developing favorably for the country's reunification, Kim Il Sung has time and again taken wise measures for opening a still newer phase for the peaceful reunification.

In his talk with reporters of the *Asahi Shimbun* of Japan on September 25 last year and another talk with a reporter of the "Kyodo News Agency" of Japan on October 8 and in his New Year address this year, he reclarified the stand of our Party and the Government of the Republic for the independent, peaceful reunification of the country and presented the most realistic proposals for peaceful reunification.

In his answers given on January 10 to the questions raised by reporters of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* of Japan and in the talk he had with reporters of *The New York Times* of the United States on May 26, he once again made clear the principled stand for our Party on the reunification problem, and advanced a new, national salvation proposal urging the South Korean rulers to take the national stand to join hands with us, conclude a peace agreement and hold north-south political negotiations.

Pak Sung Chul concluded his statement by ardently appealing to the entire people of North and South Korea to give full support to the north-south joint statement and rise up as one for its realization.

He expressed the conviction that the peoples and progressives of all countries of the world who are fighting against imperialism and colonialism and for national independence and social progress, and the international organizations and national and democratic organizations of various countries, will render absolute support to the joint statement for national reunification and express firm solidarity with the people's struggle for its realization.

Answers to Questions from Reporters

Asked about the details of the North-South Co-ordinating Committee (Point 6 of the July 4, communiqué, Pak Sung Chul said: "the agreement reached on various problems arising be-

tween the north and the south, especially on the formation and operation of a North-South Co-ordination Committee for the purpose of solving the question of national reunification, the long cherished desire of the nation, is one of the most precious successes attained in the recent contacts between the north and the south.

"Of course, a number of questions still remain to be solved, such concrete matters as how this co-ordination committee is to be formed and operated and what business it should undertake.

"We intend to reach agreements on these questions one by one in the course of contacts and negotiations to be continued in the future.

"We consider that the co-ordination committee should be a powerful consultative body for realizing broad interchange and contact between the north and the south and practically solving the question of the country's reunification.

"We are firmly convinced that the North-South Co-ordination Committee to be formed later will make a great contribution to the country's reunification by fulfilling the heavy duty it assumes."

Answering the question of what the realization of many-sided interchange between the north and south meant, Pak Sung Chul stated:

"To realize many-sided interchange means to establish broad contacts and links between the north and the south in all the political, military, economic and cultural spheres, including visits of persons and postal exchange.

"It has been our consistent stand to carry into practice many-sided interchange between the north and the south.

"Only by effecting broad interchange between the north and the south, is it possible to remove the long frozen sentiments and distrust, promote understanding and rejoin the severed national ties.

"When broad interchange is effected, the differences between the north and the south will be narrowed down, uniform development made possible and pending questions solved by the internal force of the nation in this course.

"Thus, national unity will be achieved and the peaceful reunification of the country be hastened."

Pak Sung Chul, answering the question on the prospect of the negotiation between the north and the south, said:

"In our country which remains divided for more than a quarter of a century, contacts have been made and important agreements reached between the north and the south. This is indeed an event of great significance in achieving the unity of our nation.

"The contacts between the north and the south and the successes attained through these contacts are only the initial step towards the accomplishment of the cause of reunification of our bisected country and the first fruit reaped by our people in the protracted struggle for the reunification of the country.

"Now the north and the south are confronted with more important tasks to actually settle all the problems raised between them due to the split and carry these things into practice while consolidating and developing the successes already made through mutual contacts.

"The course of the recent contacts and negotiations between the north and the south substantiated that no matter how big the differences may grow between the north and the south and how much distrust and misunderstanding they may have between them because of the prolonged division of the country, the two sides can narrow down the differences of their views and at last find common points and reach an agreement, if we Koreans sit face to face around one table and discuss matters earnestly.

"We firmly believe that under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, and with the active support of the entire people of North and South Korea and amid the expectation and concern of the honest-minded people of the whole world, the north and the south will successfully settle all the internal problems of the nation and thus accomplish the sacred cause of national reunification before long.

NORTH – SOUTH KOREA

Red Cross Talks

Information Bulletin of the CC of the DPRK Red Cross Society

Representatives of the North and South Korean Red Cross organizations agree on a five-point agenda for full-dress talks.

Following the end of the U.S. war of aggression in Korea (1950-53) over 10 million Koreans have remained separated between North and South Korea.

For the last 27 years, the 38th parallel separating north and south divided not just a nation or a land, it became a barb-wired "dollar" curtain causing untold inhuman anguish and suffering among hundreds of thousands of families and relatives.

Not even post-cards could pass between them.

Since the end of the war, the government and people of the Democratic Peoples Republic have projected proposals to the South Korean government pleading with them for joint negotiations and steps leading to a reversal and an end to the inhuman sufferings between the millions of separated families.

Finally on August 12, 1971, the South Korean government agreed to a proposal of the North Korean government for representatives of the Red Cross Societies of both sides to meet in conference and discuss steps for arranging full-dress discussions leading to reunion and communication between families and relatives from both sides. After 16 sessions and preliminary talks of 13 working-level meetings delegates of the two Red Cross Societies finally agreed on an agenda at the 20th meeting of the preliminary talks held on June 19th at Panmunjon.

The agenda agreed upon for a full-dress discussion to be followed, includes the following points:

(1) Searching for the whereabouts of family members and relatives residing in the north and south after 27 years of separation, ascertaining whether they are still alive or dead and reporting same to nearest kin.

(2) The right to visitation, meetings and correspondence between families and relatives now residing in North and South Korea.

(3) The process of helping to reunify families now dispersed in the north and south according to their free will and desires.

(4) Finally, the high level discussions of two Red Cross Societies to address themselves to humane matters and affecting families who have been separated and have no knowledge of each other's existence and whereabouts for the last 27 years.

The last, 21st, session of the delegates to the preliminary talks held on July 10 in Panmunjon agreed to form a 14-member delegation, seven from each side to continue Red Cross negotiations and exchanged the 5-point agenda in document form for the coming full dress talks. The adoption of the agenda for the full dress negotiations of the two Red Cross Societies which began on September 20, 1971 firmly guarantees a successful conclusion of the preliminary talks and indicates clear cut objectives and directions as to the problems that should be solved at the forthcoming high level conferences. The July 10 meeting in Panmunjon was held following a simultaneous announcement in Pyongyang and Seoul of the agreement reached by representatives of the governments of the north and south. This statement issued by them on July 4 set forth the 7-point program for improving relations between north and south, for reconciliation between the people of Korea and laying the basis for continued negotiation leading eventually to reunification of the present divided Korea, peacefully, democratically and independently.

The Red Cross Preparatory Delegation at its 20th session on July 10 unanimously greeted and hailed the July 4 declaration, and especially Point 4 which declared: "The two sides agreed upon rendering active cooperation in bringing to early success the North and South Red Cross talks now in progress amid the great expectation to the whole nation." The American-Korean Friendship and Information Center joins the millions of Korean people in greeting the successful conclusion of these preliminary Red Cross talks and hails it as a great contribution and as a major step for the continued struggle for a unified Korea.

On August 17, 1971, a delegation from the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, which was then visiting the Democratic People's Republic as guests of the Korean Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, issued the following statement in Pyongyang: "The representatives of the American-Friendship and Information Center greet with approval and great pleasure the recent announcement of the exchange of letters between the DPRK Red Cross Society and the South Korean Red Cross Society concerning the possibility of a meeting regarding information about family members separated from one another in the north and south and the related matters of travel, mutual visits and correspondence between family members, relatives, and friends, separated from each other in the north and south. We believe that this is a most promising and encouraging development, and we wish the Korean people success in carrying through any and all steps along the road to the unification of their divided land in a peaceful, democratic, and independent way. We support the efforts of the DPRK to achieve such unification. We believe that an indispensable condition for such unification is the removal of all vestiges of U.S. imperialism in South Korea. Such removal will make much easier such steps as those now being discussed by the DPRK Red Cross Society and the South Korean Red Cross Society."

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Write to AKFIC for details.



Reader Comments

Korea Focus is one of the most remarkable publications that has come across my desk. Within about sixty pages you have captured and delivered to your readers a deep insight into North Korea, a country known to most Americans as the site of a war (1950-1953) in which 157,530 American lives were either lost or wounded and a country proscribed for travel in our passports.

STANLEY FAULKNER

(Stanley Faulkner, civil rights attorney, visited North Korea in October 1971 as a representative of the National Lawyers Guild.)

I was truly flabbergasted when I read in the press and heard on the radio that North and South Korea had actually agreed to take the *first big step* toward peaceful re-unification. I wondered: Is it possible that the American Korean Friendship and Information Center accomplished that diplomatic triumph with just two issues of *Korea Focus*?

A columnist in the New York *Post* even recommended this example to the two Vietnams!

Regardless of that, it is definite that Americans can get a good background for understanding current Korean events by reading the two articles about re-unification on pages 18 to 22 in the Spring, 1972 issue of your excellent publication. The photos are fascinating.

Oakley C. Johnson

Thank you for sending me a copy of the publication issued by the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, "Korea Focus."

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in making this material available to me. I have taken the liberty of passing it to a member of my staff for further study. I am sure it will prove most helpful to us.

Edmund S. Muskie
United States Senator

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of the second issue of *Korea Focus*.

I apreciate your thoughtfulness in keeping me informed, and I hope that you will continue to do so.

(Continued on Page 34)

ew York Times

LATE CITY EDITION

Weather: Cloudy, cool today; chance of showers tonight and tomorrow. Temp range: today 60-76; Monday 74-86. Temp.-Hum. Index yesterday 80. Full U.S. report on Page 34.

15 CENTS

NEW YORK, TUESDAY, JULY 4, 1972

aler Kim Il Sung, at right, in Pyongyang during the recent , left, South Korean intelligence chief, about reunification.

Kim Il Sung, North

RECONCILIATION IS TOPIC: South Koreans reading reports of

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA AGREE ON GOAL OF UNITY; RENOUNCE USE OF FORCE

U.S., Welcoming Move, Affirms Support of Seoul

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 3—The United States tonight welcomed the news of the high-level contacts between North and South Korea and said that they could have "a salutary impact on prospects for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula."

At the same time, the State Department affirmed continuing United States military support for South Korea and said there would be no reduction in the current 40,000-man United States force in South Korea without close prior consultations with Seoul.

The Korean contacts were hailed by a spokesman at the Western White House at San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon is spending a working vacation, as "an encouraging indication of lessening of tensions in the area."

Long Enmity Recalled

Administration officials said that they had known of the secret talks between Lee Hu Rak, the director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and Kim Yong Ju of the North Korean Government, but asserted that the contacts had been undertaken on the initiative of the Koreans without American advice or counsel.

ahead of its release—struck State Department experts as virtually unparalleled in recent East-West relations.

"Considering the degree of distrust and enmity that existed only a couple of years ago between the two Koreas, this announcement's wording is unprecedented," one Asia specialist said.

The official United States response, made by Charles W. Bray 3d, the State Department spokesman, included one of the few lines of praise for North

Continued on Page 2, Column 3

HOT LINE PLANNED

Secret Meetings Held by High Officials in Both Capitals

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Tuesday, July 4—High-level representatives of North and South Korea held secret talks in Seoul and Pyongyang recently and agreed on principles to reunify the divided nation by peaceful means, a joint North-South communiqué announced today.

The communiqué said that Lee Hu Rak, director of

Text of joint communiqué is printed on Page 2.

South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, visited Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, from May 2 through 5 for talks with Kim Yong Ju, director of the Organization and Guidance Department of the North

HOT LINE SET UP BY THE 2 KOREAS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

scored South Korea's desire for the continued presence here of United States forces, now numbering about 40,000 men, when he said:

"Dialogue itself does not mean peace. It is only a means to achieve peace. The North-South dialogue will be very difficult, much more difficult than any other dialogues in world history. Therefore, continued all-out efforts for our national security are required to back up this dialogue."

Safeguard Against Clashes

It was not disclosed whether

Washington Hails K

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

WASHINGTON, July 4—The surprise agreement by South Korea and North Korea to undertake unification talks has produced an enthusiastic initial response in the Nixon Administration. Some senior officials even speculated today that the latest development might bring

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13 Nation UN To Korea

Korea Unity Talk Due

Seoul, Tuesday, July 4 (Combined Dispatches) — North and South Korea, after meetings in Pyongyang and in Seoul, have agreed tentatively to improve relations and discuss territorial unification of the country, South Korea announced today. [illegible] They agreed, among other things, to mutually refrain from [illegible] provocations and to in[illegible] Seoul

prevent the outbreak of unexpected military incidents," the announcement said.

Another Provision

The agreement said that the two nations have agreed not to slander or defame each other in an effort to ease tensions and foster mutual trust.

The communique was signed by Lee Hu-Rak, director of the South Korean Central Intelli[illegible] and Kim Young

UNITED NATIONS (UPI) — [illegible] ded an item Tuesday for [illegible] uration of the reunification [illegible] ion.

[illegible] item, entitled "Establ[illegible] sent of favorable condi[illegible] for acceleration of peace[illegible] ul independent reunifica[illegible] Korea," was sponsored [illegible] geria, Mali, Yugoslavia, Zambia, People's Democ[illegible] Republic of Yemen, Tan[illegible]

North-South High-Level Talks Held in Pyongyang, S

PYONGYANG, Jul. 4 (KCNA) —North-south high-level talks were held recently in Pyongyang and Seoul for an improvement in the abnormal situation caused by territorial division and national split and for the independent peaceful reun country, reflecting the unanimous asp sire of the whole nation.

At the talks in Pyongyang and Se preliminary contacts between the liai the two sides for some time, a com opinions was reached on the [illegible] country

on a number of questions for promoting the independent peaceful reunification of the country including the question of forming a North-South Coordination Com[illegible]

The holding of the north-south high-level talks and the publication of the joint statement of the north[illegible] joint statement, the frozen [illegible] north and the south [illegible]

ion HIGH-LEVEL TALKS HELD BY 2 KOREAS

Continued From Page [illegible]

ordinating committee, jointly by Mr. Lee and [illegible] to solve various pro[illegible] ting between the [illegible] the North and to soul[illegible] fication problem on [illegible] of the agreed princip[illegible] It was also agreed [illegible] and South, which sh[illegible] to a tactical state of [illegible] the 1953 armistice [illegible] many years have [illegible] bitter invective in a [illegible] agitate competition, [illegible] not to slander or de[illegible]

U.S., Welcoming Korean Move, Reaffirms Its Support of Seoul

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

Korea ever uttered by this Government.

"We welcome the joint announcement on South-North relations concerning meetings of which have taken place between representatives of the two sides and agreement on

there could be no talks until North Korea renounced any use of force, and the announcement says that unification shall be achieved through "peaceful means, and not through the use of force."

The United States forces in Korea are based there under the provisions of the United [illegible] of Korea, de-

Joint Statement of North and

Talks were held recently in Pyongyang and Seoul for discussing the question of improving the relations between the north and the south and reunifying the divided country.

Li Hu Rak, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, visited Pyongyang in the period from May 2 to 5, 1972, and had talks with Kim Yong Ju, Director of the Organisational Guidance Department in Pyongyang, and Second vice-Premier Pak Sung Chul, on behalf of Director Kim Yong Ju, visited Seoul in the period from May 29 to June 1 this [illegible]

[illegible] rector Li Hu Rak.

[illegible] ried exchange of opinions with the common desire to achieve [illegible] irliest possible date and attained big success in promoting mutual

[illegible] te accord of view on the following points to dispel misunder[illegible] b south caused by the absence of meeting for a long period [illegible] rmore, promote the reunification of the country:

the following principles of the reunification of the country:

independently, without reliance upon outside force or its inter-

d by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms

romoted first of all as one nation, transcending the differences

in slandering and calumniating the other side and from com-

mitting armed provocations, big or small, and upo[illegible] unexpected military conflicts, in order to ease the si[illegible] an atmosphere of trust.

3. **The two sides agreed upon realising versatile [illegible] south to restore the national ties now severed, pro[illegible] ent peaceful reunification.**
4. **The two sides agreed upon rendering active coop[illegible] Red Cross talks now in progress amid the great [illegible]**
5. **The two sides agreed upon installing permanent [illegible] to prevent unforeseen military incidents and deal [illegible] arising between the north and the south.**
6. **The two sides agreed upon forming and operating [illegible] Kim Yong Ju and Director Li Hu Rak as its co-[illegible] tation of these points of agreement and, at the [illegible] between the north and south and solving the questi[illegible] principles of the national reunification agreed upo[illegible]**
7. **Firmly believing that the points of agreement re[illegible] the whole nation which aspires after national reu[illegible] two sides solemnly promise to the whole nation be[illegible]**

North Korea yesterd

rea Plan for

4 (UPI)—Gerald ty press secreta night that Pres viewed the

CP calls for U.S.
to quit South Korea

NEW YORK, July 7—The cen- mittee of the Communist for complete U.S troops nd for with- orean troops order to ful- ed by newly- een North and

Want

signed by 'Gus secretary and on, the Party's ernational Affairs.

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Editorial comment

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active measures for preventing incidents of between the north and the south and create

is various fields between the north and the ual understanding and accelerate independ-

bringing to an early success the north-south of the whole nation.

elephone links between Pyongyang and Seoul ctly, promptly and, accurately the questions

South Coordination Committee with Director by the purpose of promoting the implemen- ns, improving and settling various problems ic country's reunification on the basis of the

above conform to the unanimous desire of , hailing as if days are so many years, the

Korea's Histo

By ROBERT D. McFADDEN

For seven centuries, the name by which Korea has been best known to her own people is Chosen — "the land of the morning calm." Along the rug- gedly mountainous peninsula, extending southeast from Man- churia into the Sea of Japan, there are yet many scenes of beauty and mornings of peace.

But the reality of 20th-cen- tury Korea is a history of ten- sion and conflict, of a people subjugated by the Japanese for decades, divided by victorious major powers after World

more t tury of hatred Paralle North were A t looser for c nexed barba anew eratio depe h

The Pyongyang Times

No. 28 (309) THURSDAY, JULY 6, 1972 PYONGYANG, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Great Leader Comrade KIM IL SUNG Sets Forth Three Principles of the Country's Peaceful Reunification

DPRK wins gains in new accords

By Jack A. Smith

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has won a profoundly important diplomatic and political victory.

The agreement on principles that m nounced July 4 by the Pyongyang and Sec governments, is just what the DPRK been seeking for nearly two decades.

And it has

Communist front." T People's Republic extremely warm reac hailed the events.

false label of the "United Nations Military Command."

Under Washington's command, tens of thousands of South Korean troops have gone to Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia as merce- naries of U.S imperialism's war of aggression against the peoples of Indochina.

The fulfillment of the hopes raised by the "Joint Communique of the North and South" requires agreement to withdraw all Ko- rean armed forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

It must also result in the earl- iest withdrawal of all U.S. arm- ed forces from South Korea and of U.S. "arsenals

US Not Cutting Troops In S. Korea

Mainichi Daily News

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The United States has no plans to withdraw more military forces from South Korea as a result of efforts by South and North to reduce tensions, the

most appreciative of the fact that the Republic of Korea ha kept us informed in this mat ter."

Asked when the Republic C Korea had informed the U government about the negoti with the Communis said "during as well the negotiations."

A spokesman said d States still felt that of the strong anti-Am campaign being undertak the North Korean gov it is still would be an time to reach

Rogers Calls N. Korea By Official Name

By Akira Seito, Mainichi Correspondent

WASHINGTON — Secretary State William P. Rogers re- ed to North Korea by its ial name of the Democra- People's Republic of Korea in a keynote speech at the Meeting of the South- Asia Treaty Organization e) in Canberra June 27, a learned here Friday.

ers' reference was the time in memory that the States had used North a official name.

Department spokes-

China for the first time by it official name of the People Republic of China at a dinne held in his honor by Nicol Ceausescu, President of t Rumanian State Council, October 1970.

He mentioned in his dra macy report for this year t this was "a unilateral mea taken cautiously by the to better relations betw China and the U.S."

Therefore, the observer Washington

ght Ro

Korean Accord:

Waldheim Played Role Of Secret Go-Between

GENEVA (UPI)—United Na- tions Secretary General Kurt Waldheim disclosed Tuesday

conference on Indochina.

He added that this would be difficult as long as North Viet- nam continued to oppose such a meeting. He pointed out that efforts to re-

Koreans stress own work for unification

Daily World Combined Services

Leading members of the North and South Korean governments yest mented on their historic "Joint Statement of the North and the South." mad Tuesday, in which they agreed to work toward eventual reunification of Ko nounced the use of force to accomplish that aim

In a Pyongyang news confer- ence on Wednesday, Second Dep- uty Premier Park Sung Chul of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) called the Joint Statement "a historic event which will end the 27-year-long division of the country and the antagonism between its parts."

Deputy Premier Park played an important role in the secret talks which led up to the Joint Statement. He was in Seoul, South Korea, May 29-June 1, during which he met with South Korean President Park Chung Hee.

The DPRK's Central News Agency reported "They had a frank talk. Park Chung Hee ex- pressed full support for the three principles of reunification of the country put forward by Premier Kim Il Sung."

Basis laid by talks

On May 2-5, Lee Hu Rak, dir- ector of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, went to Py- ongyang, where he held talks with Kim Yong Ju, director of the Or- ganization and Guidance Depart-



KIM IL SUNG

ment of the Korean Workers' Par- ty of the DPRK.

These talks in Seoul and Pyong- yang created the basis for the Joint Statement.

DPRK Deputy Premier Park told the Pyongyang news confer- ence: "The aim behind the publi- cation of the Joint Statement is to reaffirm by making public such an agreed text to the whole world the common desire and determination of the two sides to reunify the country independently and peacefully, to make a firm promise to carry it out and to fur- ther strengthen and amplify the successes of the North-South sum- mit talks."

In Seoul yesterday South Kor- ean Premier Kim Jong Pil, evi- dently none too happy about the Joint Statement, warned the Na- tional Assembly it would take a long time to reunify Korea. He also said that his government's re- unification policy calls for

though this statem to conflict with the Joint Statement.

Joint Statement

According to the Joint Statement issued tral News Agency in Tuesday, the two si that

"1) Unification shall ved through independe efforts without being external imposition or ence.

"2) Unification shall ved through peaceful m not through the use against each other.

"3) As a homogeneous a great national unity sought above all, trans differences in ideas, ide and systems."

Other points were that t sides agreed "not to slan defame each other," to est a "hot line" telephone lin tween Pyongyang and Seo deal with incidents to pro exchanges and talks between North and South Korea Cross, and to set up a coordi ing committee on reunificat with Kim Yong Ju and Lee Rak as co-chairmen.

The Joint Statement's t makes it clear that reunificati is to be decided solely by Ko eans. The U.S. which fought t 1950-53 Korean War under the fi leaf cover of the United Nations still maintains 50,000 troops i South Korea supposedly under the United Nations Military Command.

Obviously, there is no room on the Korean peninsula now for the UN or the U.S.

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on Tuesday said in Geneva, Switzerland, that he ap- proved of the Joint Statement, and that he had met earlier

DPRK

Key Participants in Seoul-Pyongyang Talks

Lee Hu Rak

South Korea

The South Korean official who secretly visited North Korea on a Kissinger-style mission in May is a chief adviser to President Park Chung Hee on national secu- rity affairs and one of the most influential men in Seoul.

The 48-year-old official, Lee Hu Rak, is director of South Korea's powerful Central Intelligence Agency, which has secret police as well as intelligence func- tions. Cool-headed and quiet, he prefers to stay in the background and is noted for

President Park then sent Mr. Lee to Tokyo as South Korea's Ambassador in Janu- ary, 1970, but recalled him before the year was out to head the C.I.A.

Lee Hu Rak was born in 1924 in Ulsan, then a small east coast farming town, now a flourishing industrial city. After graduating from high school there, he went on to a military academy and joined the army as a lieu- tenant before the Korean war broke out in 1950.

Second in Washington

During the three-year war, he served as chief of army intelligence and commander of the Counter-Intelligence Corps. In 1954 he became army's chief logistics of- ficer and for two years be- ginning in 1957 he served as military attaché in Washing- ton. He retired from army service with the rank of major general in 1961 short- ly before the military coup in which Mr. Park came to power.

Although Mr. Lee did not play a role in the coup, his association with Mr. Park in that year with direc- tor of the Government- operated English daily, The Korea Republic, for five months before he joined the Ruling House staff.

Mr. Lee, a Buddhist, is married and has four sons and a daughter. His hobbies include growing orchids in a large garden at his Seoul resi- dence. He is also a good player of go, a chess-like game played with stones, and

Kim Yong Ju

North Korea

The chief North Korean representative in the recent secret talks with South Korea is generally regarded as the second-ranking leader in the North even though he is list- ed officially as No. 6 in the Communist hierarchy.

He is Kim Yong Ju, 50- year-old brother of Premier Kim Il Sung, who is 60. Most South Korean analysts of North Korean affairs believe that Premier Kim is grooming his brother as his heir.

Virtually unknown outside North Korea several years ago, Kim Yong Ju rose swift- ly to his present position. He was 47th in the hierarchy of the North Korean Workers (Communist) party in 1961, up to 24th in 1967 and 12th in 1969.

His ranking was elevated to sixth in November, 1970, when the party elected him to the eleven-member Polit- buro as a full member. He had been an associate member without voting rights since 1966.

Ranks Behind Party Veterans

He ranks after Premier Kim and four other old-timers in the party, who are 60 years or older and were comrades- in-arms of Kim Il Sung in the anti-Japanese guerrilla strug- gle in the Manchurian border area in the nineteen-thirties.

He also holds the important party post of director of the Organization and Guidance Department—he is a party secretary in charge of organi- zation—and he is a member of the Central Committee and a legislator in North Korea's

1922 at Mangyongdae, near Pyongyang, the son of a farmer who was also a herb doctor. When young Kim was 3 years old, the family moved to southern Manchuria.

As a teen-ager, some ex- perts on North Korea in Seoul say, he joined his brother as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter.

In 1941, he reportedly fl to Siberia as the Japanese in- tensified their campa against the Korean guerri In 1945 he entered a Mo University to study po and economics. After li tion, he returned to Korea, where his brot ready headed the C ment, arriving after th of the Korean war.

In Moscow Again

He went to Mosc in 1952 to attend a nist party school. Pyongyang in the the began active w party as a "guidanc

As is often t Communist count known about the of Kim Yong Ju ried and has t and he is said adopted two

As a key pa charge of or has been ma forts to build of young pa solutely loya and to cons mier's posit lenged rule He is belie an importa purges of

PARK CHUNG HEE

(Continued from Page 31)

If I can ever be of service, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Lloyd Bentsen
United States Senator

Thank you for your letter and the enclosed copy of the publication "Korea Focus."

It was thoughtful of you to make this information available to me and I look forward to reading it at my first opportunity.

E. Everett Jordan
United States Senator

I really enjoyed "We Have Nothing in the World to Envy." We had a successful showing here and I appreciated all of your assistance in making sure that I received it as scheduled.

James K. Ash
History Department
Fort Lewis College
Durango, Colorado

I was at the Chicago protest demonstration against the war in Korea. I still have the August 13 issue of *U.S. News and World Report* of 1954 in which Syngman Rhee admitted that the South Koreans started the war when they got the green light from Washington.

William H. Scharbilleg

I am sending money for a subscription and a $3 contribution. My wife and I are two old-time Wobblies (I.W.W.). We like your magazine, and we will also try to spread its information to others.

Miller Russity

I have read your position paper on Korea, Operation Warship. I plan to use it to write an article for our local labor newspaper, *New Age*. We hope this paper is getting wide circulation so that the American people will be well informed on the truth about Korea.

Paul Krehbiel

I received my first copy of *Korea Focus* and am very impressed. I find it informative, engaging and of notable quality in its intent and accuracy.

Tyrone Monte

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The Transformation Of The Economic Geography Of The DPRK

Korea has been divided into two vastly different socio-economic systems for over a quarter of a century: a socialist North and a capitalist South. Accordingly, these two unlike social-economic systems have created different patterns within the two parts of Korea. The major historical periods in the modern development of Korea are: (1) the transformation of Korea into an "African-style" colony by Japan; (2) the division of Korea into a northern and a southern part; (3) the Korean War; and (4) the development of a modern socialist economy in the North and a capitalist economy in the South. The present article is devoted to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; a later article will deal with the Republic of Korea.

An Overview

The Korean peninsula, containing about 85,300 square miles, is roughly the size of Minnesota and has a latitudinal extent of about that between New England and South Carolina, with the expected climatic variety.

Only 1/5 of the peninsula is made up of plains and flat areas suitable for agriculture and none of these is extensive. This characteristic Korea shares with neighboring Japan. The North Korean mountains reaching over 8,000 feet, make up the northern interior. Parallel to the eastern coast are the Taebaek-san (Taebaek range) and further west are the hills and plains of western Korea containing the drainage basins of the Hangang (Han River), which flows through Seoul, and the Kumgang. To the south are the low mountains, hills and basins of South Korea. The island of Chejudo also belongs to Korea.

The Korean climate resembles that of eastern North America with strong contrasts between the seasons, with freezing winters and hot summers. For example, Seoul has a $+100°F$ maximum and a $-10°F$ minimum temperature. There are also strong contrasts between north and south Korea. The north has a much greater temperature range than the south while the south has more precipitation than the north (60 inches compared to 20 inches).

The mid-year 1970 estimated population of the Korean peninsula was 46 million, of which 99 percent were Korean and most of the minority were Chinese. This fact makes Korea a remarkably homogeneous land, particularly in light of its colonial history. This population, spread over the Korean territory, gives a density of 422 persons per square mile, a density exceeded only by Japan in Asia. However, the spatial distribution of the population is uneven. On the sea coasts and in the valleys, the densities range from 500 persons to over 1,000 persons per square mile, while in the mountain areas of the north and east, the density is about 26 per square mile. In the past two decades, Korea has been experiencing a strong trend towards urbanization.

Korea is one of the most ancient cultures in East Asia and was unified into a feudal state in the VIIth century. In this period the main economic activity was agriculture, with rice as the leading crop. The crafts (silk, ceramics, etc.) also played an important role. The most important influence on the development of Korea's culture was naturally that great civilization to her west, China. In fact, Korea played the historical role of an important land bridge bringing Chinese civilization to Japan. The high point of Korea's cultural development was during the XIVth and XVth centuries. This was followed by two destructive periods in Korea's history—the

Robert Ante, a scholar of Far Eastern and Central Asian affairs, is professor of economic geography at Queens College.

invasion by Japanese feudal lords at the beginning of the XVIth Century and the Manchu occupation in the mid-XVIIth Century. These invasions created the desire for external isolation, hence Korea's appellation as the "Hermit Nation." However, this isolation hindered Korea's economic and cultural advancement for more than two centuries, creating a crisis situation within Korean feudal society during the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries.[1]

Koree Under Japan

The economic development of Korea under Japan falls into two major periods with the 1930's as the watershed. In the second half of the XIXth, Century, Korea was the object of foreign expansion and was transformed from a formally independent country[2] over which Japanese influence was increasing to a protectorate of Japan in 1905[3] and finally a part of the Japanese empire in 1910. Henceforth, Korean agriculture was developed as an appendage to Japan while industry was developed in the interests of the Japanese monopolies.[4]

[1] Albert Kolb, *Ostasien* (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer Verlag, 1963). *Vide* Chapter V, "Korea—das Brückenland," pp. 451-475.

[2] The Treaty of Shemonoseki of 1895 recognized Korean independence.

[3] The Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japan's "paramount interests" in Korea.

[4] In fact, the Japanese closed down many Korean companies such as the Korean Land and Maritime Transportation Company and the Korea Hide Company while banking and finance were controlled by the Japanese. *Vide* Woo-kenn Han *The History of Korea* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970), p. 469

Japan developed Korean agriculture to serve the needs of Japan. Because of Korea's favorable climate, rice was the major grain grown. Yet, in south Korea, under the influence of Japanese economic policy, the main food grain became barley, while a large share of the rice was sold to Japan.[1] Japan had developed a trade triangle within the yen block whereby Korea imported millet from Manchuria and exported rice to Japan. In fact, in 1938, Japan (80.8 per cent), and Manchuria (13.9 per cent) and other parts of occupied China and the yen block made up no less than 99.3 per cent of Korea's foreign trade. Under Japan, Korea became one of the major rice exporting countries on earth, and was *the* leading producer for many years.

The second ranking agricultural export according to value was raw silk. Between 1934 and 1938, Korea exported between 2,000 and 2,750 tons, mostly in the form of cocoons, but some in a semi-finished or finished state.[2] Other important agricultural products which Korea supplied to Japan were soybeans, cotton, and fruits.

By 1942, the Japanese Oriental Colonization Society had seized 80 per cent of Korea's forests and 25 per cent of the arable land, impoverishing the Korean peasantry while introducing highly advanced agricultural technologies on the land.[3]

[1] Hermann Lautensach, *Korea: eine Landeskunde auf Grund eigener Reisen und der Literatur* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1945), p. 401

[2] Lautensach, *op. cit.*, p. 460

[3] Jean Suret-Canale "Le développement économique de la Republique populaire démocratique de Corée" *Annales de Géographie* No. 443 (Janvier-Février, 1972) LXXXIe année, pp. 50-51

Up to the 1930's, Japan developed non-agricultural industries mainly to supply Japan with mineral raw materials, and therefore mining was developed by the Japanese. The Japanese began to acquire mining concessions at the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and there was a steady development until the World Depression.

TABLE I

MINERAL OUTPUT OF KOREA — 1936

	weight	*value*	
		million yen	*per cent*
Vein gold	14,722 kg.	49.9	45.2
Silver	58,821 kg.	2.8	2.5
Gold and Silver ore	79,029 tons	9.4	8.5
Placer gold	2,768 kg.	9.4	8.5
Copper ore	2,590 tons	0.06	0.05
Raw Copper	3,637 tons	3.3	3.0
Iron ore	629,000 tons with 283,000 tons of iron	1.9	1.7
Zinc	—	0.2	0.2
Lead	2,738 tons	0.8	0.7
Tungstic acid	1,707 tons	2.3	2.1
Molybdenum	80 tons	0.2	0.2
Arsenic acid	230 tons	0.03	0.03
Coal	2,282,000 tons	13.3	12.0
Graphite	40,914 tons	1.0	0.9
Mica	70 tons	—	—
Fluorspar	8,740 tons	0.1	0.1
Alunite	114,569 tons	0.7	0.6
Barite	5,113 tons	0.07	0.06
Magnesite	14,258 tons	0.04	0.04
Other minerals	—	15.0	13.6
		110.5	100.0

Source: **Herman Lautensach: *Korea* (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1945), p. 429**

As Table I shows, gold was the most valuable product mined in Korea during this period. Indeed, Korea was among the six largest gold producers in the world.[1] It is interesting to note that the standard histories of Japanese economic development do not recognize the significant role played by Korean gold. In fact, the depreciation of the yen led to a rapid development of the Korean gold mining industry and because Japan needed gold for foreign exchange, even marginal ores were utilized.[2] Gold made up not only about half of the value of mineral exports from Korea,[3] but also contributed more than half of the total Japanese gold production.[4] With World War II, Japan no longer needed gold and production practically stopped, (See Table II). This illustrates the fragile character of industry under imperialism.

Perhaps more interesting than the large gold production revealed in Table I is the relatively underdeveloped iron ore and coal mining industries.

In the 1930's, Japan was preparing for war against China and the USSR and began to develop Korea as a supply base for its aggression. Japan began the creation of large military-industrial enterprises, the development of electrical energy, and the chemical industry. In 1938, industrial production equalled half the value of production in the country.

[1] George M. McCune, "Gold Mining in Korea," *The Voice of Korea* III.72 (November 30, 1946), p. 1

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] It should be noted that until 1940, the largest gold mine in Korea was operated as an American concession. *Ibid,* p. 3

[4] Lautensach *op. cit.,* p. 434

During World War II, the Japanese emphasized the development of heavy industry in Korea to such an extent that the mining, energy, metallurgical, chemical and forestry sectors of the economy made up 63 per cent of Korea's industrial production. Table II demonstrates that the mining sector underwent a large increase during World War II—especially coal and iron ore. Based on the figures in Table II, if 1938 is given as 100, the 1944 production indices for anthracite coal is 261, for lignite—155, and for iron ore—433! In fact, only gold and copper production declined, while the ferrous metal ores (magnesite, tungsten ores, etc.) had spectacular increases. Korea supplied 100 per cent of Japan's consumption of magnesite, graphite, mica, cobalt and boron.

TABLE II
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR MINERALS IN KOREA

	(in metric tons)	
	1938	*1944*
Anthracite coal	1,723,290	4,530,263
Lignite coal	1,696,061	2,518,513
Iron ore	768,000	3,331,814
Gold (in kg.)	27,788	598
Copper	5,828	5,193
Amorphous graphite	44,815	74,879
Crystalline graphite	12,503	28,427
Tungsten ore	2,625	8,333
Lead	6,086	21,200
Zinc	9,167	—
Zinc (metallic)	—	20,011
Manganese	780	33,584
Fluorspar	37,391	75,227
Magnesite	31,937	157,745

Source: The Bank of Korea, *Economic Review 1949.* Seoul, Korea, 1950. Table 51. Cited in Shannon McCune's *Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Geography* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956), p. 219

At the same time, other industrial sectors of Korea increased production. Table III gives the number of industrial establishments and the number of workers in Korea for 1938 and 1944. The number of factories increased by only about 77 per cent while the number of workers almost doubled in this period, indicating a trend towards larger industrial enterprises.

First, those industries with the largest increase in the number of workers were gas and electricity, metal working, lumber and woodworking, ceramics and machinery and tools, while those industries with the lowest indices were food processing, chemicals, and textiles.

At the same time, while the number of workers in food processing remained almost stationary, the number of enterprises declined to 85 per cent of the 1938 number, indicating a concentration into larger enterprises. Furthermore, much of this increase is illusory from the Korean standpoint, since a large part of the food and textile industry had become converted from domestic consumption to military provisions.

A consequence of Japan's exploitation of Korea as a materials base for its war machine was that a large part of the Korean population had been transformed into industrial workers. According to Table III, by 1944 there were over 400,000 workers in factories. An estimated 40 per cent of these were in large enterprises. In 1938, there were about half as many, and in

TABLE III	1938		1944		Percent increase (1938=100)	
Industry	*# of factories*	*# of workers*	*# of factories*	*# of workers*		
Textiles	608	47,384	2,082	81,441	342	172
Metal working	295	13,612	619	61,523	210	452
Machinery & tools	613	24,745	1,226	64,048	200	359
Ceramics	342	11,310	1,952	44,192	578	391
Chemicals	1,618	52,298	1,019	70,338	63	135
Lumber & woodworking	360	7,485	1,799	30,682	500	410
Printing & binding	313	6,905	586	10,121	187	147
Food processing	2,348	35,547	1,990	36,006	85	101
Gas & electricity	34	939	140	7,725	412	823
Miscellaneous	442	12,179	888	15,153	201	124
	6,953	212,459	12,301	421,229	177	198

Source: Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage: A Regional and Social Goegraphy* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1956), p. 225. Indices prepared by R. Ante.

1928 there were only about 83,000 industrial workers.

In summary, the industrial development of Korea on the eve of the Japanese defeat reflected a colonial character. Machinery and machine-building sectors of the economy were not developed; the textile and food industries were connected to military production; a disproportionate share of industry was in the power sector; there was an absence of finished silk production; and a dependence upon Japan for finished goods. (In 1942, 80 per cent of all goods consumed in Korea were imported from Japan).

Furthermore, Japanese domination of Korea's economic development created great regional dislocations in the economy. About 80 per cent of all the production of heavy industry by value (1940) was found in the north, which contained 85 per cent of the metal production, 88 per cent of the chemical industry and 92 per cent of the electrical industry. On the other hand, about 70 per cent of the agricultural production by value (1940) and 75 per cent of the light industry was located in the south, which contained the largest part of the area under rice and also about 70 per cent of the area under cotton.

At the end of World War II, the Korean people found their country quite different from the Korea of 1905, with the material basis for further development for themselves and not the Japanese.

Divided Korea and the Korean War

While the industrial structure of the country was deformed and unevenly distributed (along with agriculture), the wartime efforts of the Japanese militarists would have provided the Korean people with an economy which contained a great deal of regional specialization and the foundations for further development. However, Korea's development was not going to experience such a smooth transition. First, the retreating Japanese destroyed much of what they had built (as we shall see later); second, the two complementary halves of Korea—an industrial North and an agricultural South—were separated and made unoperable; and third, what the retreating Japanese had not destroyed and what had been rebuilt and expanded, was demolished by the U.S.A. The following passage gives an idea of the destruction:

> *"With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 . . . air raids, ground warfare, scorched-earth tactics, all took a tremendous toll. It is difficult to assess exactly what remains of the industrial complex north of the truce line. U.S. Air Force commanders commented during the latter stages of the fighting that there was nothing left to bomb. Many of the industrial sections of the cities of South Korea were reduced to rubble during the fighting or were devastated by fires. Thus, when Seoul was ultimately retaken by United Nations forces, the city's industrial plants were estimated to be 85 per cent destroyed."*[1]

Shannon McCune noted that "the area around Pyongyang was said to be only rubble."[2] With regard to the DPRK, McCune quotes a North Korean radio broadcast that the war damage in the DPRK had been "more than one billion dollars worth of damage . . . and tens of thousands



Cartography by Robert Ante.

Industries and railroads

of men . . . (and that) production decreased to less than forty per cent of that of 1949 . . ."[3]

[1] Norton Ginsburg, et. al., *The Pattern of Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 139

[2] Shannon McCune, *Korea's Heritage: a regional and social geography* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1965), p. 148

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 123

The primary act of socialization of the DPRK's economy occurred in August 10, 1946, when the state sector of the economy was formed from the nationalization of over 1,000 enterprises. These made up 90 per cent of the DPRK's industry. Furthermore, the banks and transportation and communication were nationalized. Most of these nationalized enterprises belonged to the Japanese and their agents. The planned development of the DPRK's industry resulted in an increase by 3.4 times of the total industrial ouptut in 1949 compared with 1946, while the state sector increased by 4.2 times.[1] As Table IV shows, the Korean War destroyed practically all of the concrete progress made between 1945 and 1950. All production of pig iron, steel, and chemical fertilizers ceased, while every other item listed in the table suffered sharp declines.

TABLE IV
PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS ITEMS, 1949 AND 1953

		Production	
Product	*Units*	*1949*	*1953*
Electricity	10^9 KWH	2.7	1.0
Coal	10^6 tons	2.0	0.7
Pig iron	10^3 tons	165.7	0
Steel	10^3 tons	146	0
Cement	10^3 tons	283	27
Bricks	10^6 pieces	44	17
Chemical fertilizers	10^3 tons	131	0
Cotton cloth	10^3 meters	20.5	9.5
Silk cloth	10^3 meters	1.65	0.85
Shoes	10^3 pairs	?	7
Fish products	10^3 tons	157	122

Source: Annales de Geographie No. 385 (Mai-Juin, 1962), p. 333

The Construction of a Modern Economy in the DPRK

After the Korean War, the DPRK made great efforts to reconstruct their devastated country. Their endeavors were aided by the socialist countries, particularly the USSR and the Chinese Peoples Republic. By 1960, these two countries gave an estimated $750 million and $500 million respectively. By January 1966, the Soviet Union gave Korea 58 industrial enterprises.[2] In 1968, the DPRK could produce in 19 days what it took one year to produce on the eve of Japan's occupation.

[1] Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," *China Quarterly No. 14* (April-June) 1963, p. 52

[2] V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 69

The problem in the DPRK was not only the necessity to have more production and the creation of new branches of industry, but also the transformation of an economy deformed by an oppressive Japanese militarism. In the industrial sector the emphasis was upon heavy industry (especially machinery, non-ferrous metallurgy, mineral fertilizers, construction materials, and cement), while light industry devoted special attention to the food industry (milk, meat, conserves, tobacco, fish). Table V illustrates the transformation in the sectoral relationship of the DPRK's industrial structure until 1959. As we shall see, the decline in the production of electroenergy, trade, mining, metallurgy and the chemical industries are *relative* declines only, for these industries have experienced substantial increases. Rather, their

TABLE V
CHANGES IN THE PROPORTION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY BRANCHES, 1944-1959

Branch of Industry	*1944*	*1949*	*1959*	*Percentage point change 1959-1944*
Electroenergy	1.4	1.6	0.3	− 1.1
Trade	3.8	4.1	1.3	− 2.5
Mining	15.7	8.1	3.9	−11.8
Metallurgy	13.3	11.0	6.2	− 7.1
Machine-building and metal-working	1.6	8.1	20.6	+19.0
Chemical industry	10.1	9.5	5.5	− 4.6
Industrial construction	2.5	2.5	6.3	+ 3.8
Textiles	6.0	11.4	17.4	+11.4
Food	7.8	19.4	15.6	+ 7.8
Fishing	11.0	6.2	2.1	− 8.9
Other (forestry, village handicrafts, etc.)	26.8	18.1	20.8	− 6.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0

Source: "Koreya" *Kratkaya Geograficheskaya Entsiklopediya* Vol. 2 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoye Nauchnoye Izdatel'stvo "Sovyetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1961), p. 361. Percentage point changes added by R. Ante.

relative decline is a reflection of the great increases in machine building, textiles, and food. The division of Korea made expansion of the last two sectors essential.

The Economic-Geographic Transformation of the DPRK

A truer appreciation of the various achievements and problems faced by the Korean people in the development of their material economy can be gained by an economic-geographic analysis of the material economy. Space limits the selection of economic sectors and prohibits a thorough analysis of each sector. For example, important economic-geographic factors such as transportation and circulation in general are not discussed at all. At times, the facts available (or unavailable) do not permit much discussion. Nor is the important topic of the development of economic regions and their role in economic planning discussed. Furthermore, the reader should understand that the maps included in this article are not intended to be comprehensive, but only to indicate the most important places and to aid the reader in locating places not contained on the maps of most Atlases. However, the following pages do reveal something of the economic potential of the DPRK.

The Fuel and Energy Base of the DPRK

The basis of industrial civilization is the utilization of inanimate energy, which has raised mankind's productive capacity to unprecedented heights. So basic is the utilization of inanimate energy to the process of economic development that many economists and geographers consider it one of the best measures of economic development, especially in its more mobile form of electrical energy.

Electrical energy is generated in two principal ways from the geographical point of view: thermal stations, which burn a fuel to raise steam for turning the generators; and hydroelectric stations, which use falling water for turning the generators. The particular choice will depend upon several factors such as the availability and cost of thermal fuels, the availability, rate of flow, and seasonality of flow of the water resources, the time and nature of peak demands for electricity, etc. No hard and fast rules can be laid down because the choice or the combination depends upon local concrete conditions. It should be pointed out, however, that hydroelectricity is not "free," for the initial costs of construction greatly exceed those of thermal electrical plants.

Table VI presents an overview of Korea's fuel-energy resources. Several things strike the eye from this Table. First, the share of Korea's hydroelectric resources compared with the total resource fund is not even one per cent. However, this is really another manner of expressing Korea's great mineral fuel reserves, because she has more hydroelectric reserves on a per capita or square mile basis than France, Italy, or Great Britain. The DPRK has an average of 56,000 tons of primary energy reserves (in terms of conventional fuel) per square mile. However, the DPRK has certain deficiencies and obstacles

TABLE VI **KOREA'S FUEL ENERGY RESOURCES**

		Reserves in natural condition			*Reserves counted in conventional fuel (7,000 cal/kg) in million tons*		
	Units	*All Korea*	*North Korea*	*South Korea*	*All Korea*	*North Korea*	*South Korea*
Coal, total	million tons	9596	7838	1758	8177	6617	1560
of which anthracite	"	6708	5250	1458	6243	4883	1360
brown coal	"	2888	2588	300	1934	1734	200
Peat	"	500	300	200	200	120	80
Firewood	million cubic meters	43	33	10	22	16	6
Hydroelectricity	million kilowatts	10	8	2	11	9	2
TOTAL FUEL ENERGY RESOURCES			8410		6762	1648	

Source: V. V. Martynov *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 71



Cartography by Robert Ante.

in its fuel pattern. First, note that petroleum and natural gas are absent from the Table. There is no evidence of petroleum or gas deposits on the Korean peninsula. Second, the energy reserves are unevenly distributed—the major concentrations are in Pyongan-namdo, Hamgyong-namdo, and Chagangdo provinces. Third, bituminous and high quality coking coals are missing. Fourth, the geologic structure of the coal deposits is not always favorable.

The Coal Mining Industry

As noted above (see Table II), coal mining was neglected until the Japanese began to prepare for war. In fact, before World War II, bituminous coal had to be imported from Manchuria and Northern China for Korea's railroad locomotives, power stations, and factories.[1] As the map of Korea's coal deposits and Table VI show, Korea has abundant supplies of coal, although she is deficient in bituminous coal. The most important coal basin is the Pyongyang anthracite basin; the most important brown coal deposits are at Aojiri.

The Pyongyang deposits supply about ⅔ of the DPRK's mined anthracite. The major mines which work these deposits are along the midcourse of the Taedonggang at Sunchon and include the districts of Unsan, Pukchan, and the southeastern part of Kaechon. These deposits are in strongly disturbed beds and the coal occurs as a kind of powder, making it difficult to mine. However, the great size of the reserves and the firm rock roof support permit these deposits to be of great economic importance.

Northeast of Sunchon in Kaechon district are found the Kaechon anthracite mines.

[1] Shannon McCune, *Korea: Land of Broken Calm* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1966), pp. 87-88

On the edge of the northwestern anthracite basin are the anthracite mines of Tokchon, a little to the north of the Pyongan-namdo border. The deposits located in the district of Kujang in Pyongan-pukdo province have a special significance. The anthracite mined here is marked "B" in the DPRK and is utilized to produce metallurgical coke.

Third place in the production of anthracite is held by the district of Kangdong. This deposit, located in the vicinity of Pyongyang, contains about ¼ of the DPRK's anthracite reserves.

On the eastern side of the country are the large coal mines at Kowon and Munchon, which extract coal from the Kowon deposits. Occupying the districts of Sudong, Yonghung, and Kowon in Hamgyong-namdo province and Chonnae district in Kangwondo province, these mines produc eabout 1/10 of all the DPRK production.

There are also two small anthracite mines in Chagangdo province at Kangge and at Chonchon.

The Tumangang coal basin is the major DPRK deposit of brown coal. Major producing centers are at Kogonwon, Onsong, Hamen, etc. The Tumangang basin produces about ⅔ of all the brown coal in the DPRK.

Between Chonjin and Kilju is the second place producer of brown coal, the Anchong coal basin. Mined at Yongan and other places, about 1/6 of the DPRK brown coal is produced here. However, the high quality of this coal (in some places approaching long-flame gas coal) gives it an important economic-geographic significance. The Tumangang and Anchong produce 90 per cent of the DPRK's brown coal.

The remaining production is at the Anju coal basin in Pyongan-namdo province. This basin has the only local coal production of bituminous-like coal in the western part of the DPRK and is therefore a major coal center.

As noted above, while the DPRK has tremendous coal reserves, the types of coal found in the country are not so favorable. Despite the large deposits of anthracite and brown coal, the country lacks those coals which are more commonly used in metallurgy in other countries. At present the DPRK can only meet 90 per cent of its needs and must import the remainder —mostly from China. In order to remove these deficiencies, the DPRK has striven to increase production and conduct research.

In order to widen the utilization of Korea's coals, the Scientific Coal Research Institute of the DPRK was established. Anthracite brickettes manufactured from the powdery South Pyongyang basin coals can be mixed with coke. Anthracite coal has also been economically manufactured into coke. Work is also being carried out on the manufacture of coke from brown coal. In the DPRK, the brown coal



Cartography by Robert Ante.

charge can reach 30 per cent in the coke charge.

Coal is used not only as a mineral fuel, but also as a raw material. Korea's anthracite is used to produce calcium carbide, the raw material for Korea's rapidly growing synthetic fibers industry. At Aochi, brown coal is used to produce methyl ether, spirits, acids, etc.

Table VII reflects not only the destruction of the Korean War (note production for 1953), but the great transformation of coal production, especially during the 1960's. By 1970, coal production reached 27.5 million tons.[1] This gigantic leap forward in coal production is due in large part to the introduction of mechanization and the expansion of mines. Table VIII reflects this trend. In 1956, almost half the coal mines in Korea had capacities of less than 100,000 tons. Furthermore, in 1956, only 15 per cent of the coal mining was mechanized; but increased to 70 per cent in 1965. Especially important for Korea with its powdery coals has been the introduction of hydraulic mining methods. Pit mining is also expanding. As Table VIII reveals, by 1962 the small mines contributed only 2.1 per cent of Korea's production, while the large mines contributed over half. Now, ten years later, we can assume that the share of the large mines has grown even larger. The coal industry of the DPRK has been transformed and future development should bring about further changes as the Korean people strive to overcome the lack of petroleum, natural gas, and the lack of many kinds of coals.

[1] The planned production in 1970 was 27 million tons. Kim Il Sung, *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea* (NY: Int'l. Pub., 1971), p. 187

Electrical Production

As Table IX shows, the bulk of electricity

TABLE VII

COAL PRODUCTION IN THE DPRK
(millions of tons)

	1946	*1949*	*1953*	*1956*	*1963*	*1964**	*1967*	*1970***
All coal	1.3	4.0	0.7	3.9	14.0	14.4	22.0	27.5
of which:								
Anthracite	0.8	2.1	0.3	2.4	9.7		16.0	—
Brown coal	0.5	1.9	0.4	1.5	4.3		6.0	—

Sources: V. V. Martynov *Koreya* (Moskva, 1970), p. 77
* Kim Il Sung, *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea (N.Y.:* International Publishers, 1971), p. 79
** Speech by Kim Chol Sik to AKFIC delegation.

TABLE VIII

COAL MINES OF THE DPRK ACCORDING TO CAPACITY

	Number of coal mines			*Total production*		
	1956	*1959*	*1962*	*1956*	*1959*	*1962*
All mines	100	100	100	100	100	100
of which:						
up to 100 thousands tons	45.6	28.9	13.5	20.7	4.0	2.1
101-250 " "	33.3	28.9	23.3	48.2	17.2	9.9
251-500 " "	21.1	23.8	36.6	31.1	30.8	35.5
over 500 " "	—	18.4	26.6	—	48.0	52.5

Source: V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 73

TABLE IX

PRODUCTION OF ELECTROENERGY IN THE DPRK
(millions of kilowatt hours)

	1946	*1949*	*1953*	*1956*	*1963*	*1964**	*1967*	*1970***
Total electricity	3.9	5.9	1.0	5.1	11.8	12.5	13.5	16.5
of which								
hydro	3.3	4.7	1.0	5.0	10.6	—	10.8	—
thermal	0.6	1.2	—	0.1	1.2	—	2.7	—

Sources: V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 89
* Kim Il Sung, *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea*, (International Publishers: New York, 1971), p. 79
** From speech by Kim Chol Sik.



Cartography by Robert Ante.

production in the DPRK is from hydroelectric stations. North Korea has estimated reserves of 8 million kilowatts of hydroelectricity. Besides mighty streams such as the Amnokkang (Yalu River), geomorphological conditions in the DPRK are favorable for the construction of hydroelectric stations. While hydroelectric stations generally require higher investments than thermal stations, they also enable water control against floods, irrigation, etc. to be carried out.

The Japanese built the first hydroelectric station in 1905. From this modest beginning with a capacity of only 500 kilowatts the Japanese constructed 20 stations with a combined capacity of 1,630,000 kilowatts by the end of 1944. The production of electriciyt was controlled by three Japanese monopolies: the Yalu Korean Hydroelectric Company, the Choson Electricity Company, and the Kangge Hydroelectric Company. When the Japanese retreated from Korea in 1945, they stripped about 60 per cent of all the hydroelectric stations in North Korea. Between 1946 and 1950 many of these were put into operation only, as Table IX shows, to be destroyed during the Korean War. By 1956, most of the destruction was repaired. Today the DPRK has 26 large stations and about 1200 medium and small sized hydroelectric stations with a capacity of about 2 million kilowatts. The 1970 goal was 16 billion kwh of electricity.[1] Table IX shows that this goal was surpassed. Production in 1970 was planned to reach 1,184 kwh per capita.[2]

[1] Kim Il Sung; *Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea,* op. cit., p. 187
[2] Ibid, p. 188

The most intensive hydroelectric development in the DPRK is on the rivers of the northern part of the country: the Amnokkang (Yalu) and its tributaries the Changjingang, Hochongang, Pujongang, and Toknogang. The largest complex on the Amnokkang is the Supung hydroelectric station with a defined capacity of 700,000 kilowatts. After the Supung station is the Changjingang hydroelectric station with a capacity of 400,00 kilowatts. On the Hochongang is a station with a capacity of 300,000 kilowatts and on the Pujongang is a water reservoir which serves two hydrostations that have a total capacity of 200,000 kilowatts.

One of the first post-Korean War hydroelectric constructions in the DPRK was the Toknogang station. It started production in 1959 and has three hydrogenerators with capacities of 30,000 kilowatts each. Also on the Toknogang at Kangge are three hydrogenerators with a total capacity of 246,000 kilowatts.

The Amnokkang and its tributaries have 19 large electrical stations with a total capacity of 1.9 million kilowatts or 80 per cent of all the electricity produced in the DPRK. A hydroelectric dam 800 meters long is being created at Ungbong with a capacity of 2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. Another project is the Puryong hydro-system with three stations totalling 45,000 kilowatts.

On the Sodusu (a tributary of the Tumangang) is a station with a 340,000 kilowatt capacity.

On the Chongchonggang and the Taedonggang, the capacity was 200,000 kilowatts in 1965.

Thermal stations still only supply a small share of the total electrical energy, but this share has been increasing in the 1960's. A 400,000 kilowatt thermal station constructed in Pyongyang and a 600,000 kilowatt station is being constructed at Pukchon with Soviet aid.

The great advantage of electrical power is its mobility. However, this mobility requires the construction of special means of transportation, i.e. electrical transmission lines. Under the Japanese, transmission lines never exceeded 3700 miles. During the Korean War most of the lines were destroyed and only about 625 miles remained. By 1953 there were 3100 miles of lines and by 1956 all of the destroyed lines were restored and extended. In 1957 new transmission lines were constructed between the Supung hydroelectric station and Kangge and in 1958 new lines between Supung and Pyongyang. Recent lines have also joined the hydroelectric stations with Hamhung, Chonjin, Sariwon, etc. Today the length of lines are about double that of 1949. Furthermore, whereas in 1949 Korea's lines had a variety of voltages (3, 6, 20, 66, 110, 154), today the voltage is unified (220).

The Mining Industry

The Korean peninsula is rich in mineral wealth, and the development of mineral exploi-

tation was initiated by the Japanese to supply their war economy. (See Tables I and II). This development was uneven, and in 1944 about 70 per cent of all ores produced in Korea came from the northern part of the country. Again, the familiar pattern: destruction by the retreating Japanese, reconstruction, and an intensive destruction by U.S.A. military forces. It should be noted that Korea did have the advantage of Japanese geological and exploratory work. Of course, this has been pursued and expanded by the Korean people.

Iron Ore—The most important iron ore deposit is the Musan iron ore basin in the far north of the DPRK. These deposits, with about 40 per cent metal content, are treated and the enriching plant at Musan has a capacity of 2 million tons of iron ore concentrate per year. Iron ore is also produced in the southern part of the country at Inri, Chaeryong, and Kaechon. In 1966, the DPRK produced twice as much iron ore as in 1944, or 5.5 million tons.

Besides iron ore, the DPRK produces chrome, manganese, wolframite (at Kumgang and other places), and other alloy metals.

Lead and zinc—In 1967, the DPRK was the largest producer of lead and zinc concentrates in Asia. The most notable producing area is at Komdok.

Metallurgical Industries

The iron and steel making industries are located in the northeast and in the lower course of the Taedonggang. The major factors in the location of the Korean iron and steel industry are the distribution of the raw materials and the need to import coking coal.

Kim Chaek is the main metallurgical center in the northeast, with coke ovens, blast furnaces, converter furnaces, and rolling mills. Chonjin is a major producer of pig iron. The northeast is also a major producer of high quality ferrous alloys based upon the large supplies of electricity from the Puryong, Hochongang and other hydroelectric stations. Ferrosilicon, ferrochromium, ferrotitanium, and ferrotitanium-chromium are produced in Puryong. These alloys are consumed mainly by Kim Chaek.

In the western part of the country, the largest metallurgical base is at Songnim, which uses ores from Hwanghae-namdo (Chaeryong, etc.) and metallurgical fuel imported from China. Songnim has a complete metallurgical cycle—coke ovens, blast furnaces, Martin furnaces, rolling mills. Southwest of Pyongyang at the Kangso Steel Alloy Works is the largest metallurgical enterprise in the DPRK. Kangso uses electrofurnaces and imported pig iron. Another major center is at Pyongyang itself, which uses raw materials imported from Hwanghae. Incidentally, the Japanese dumped thousands of key parts of the mill into the Taedonggang to frustrate and hamper Korean operation of the mill.[1]

As Table IV shows, in 1949 the DPRK produced 146,000 tons of steel and in 1953—zero! In 1970, more than 2,200,000 tons of steel were produced.[2] The much wider assortment of steel produced also reflects the development of steel making in the DPRK.

Very little information is available on nonferrous metallurgy. The main centers are at Nampo, Munchon, and Hungnam.

Machine Building

As mentioned above, the Japanese neglected machine building in Korea. What little there was, was destroyed during the Korean War. As Kim Il Sung pointed out, a modern machine building industry "could not be built merely by rehabilitating and developing the industry which already existed."[3] However, machine building is extremely important for the development of all other aspects of modern industrial society. Table V illustrates the advance and attention that the DPRK has given this sector of the economy. The machine building sector is oriented towards the further development of light industry and agriculture. Today, the DPRK produces electric Diesel locomotives, large-size excavators, steel pipe, tractors, motorcycles and electronic equipment. The development of the machine building sector is a first achievement of the Korean people. The main machine building centers are located in the northwestern part of the country (Pyongyang, Hichon, Kuson) and at Wonsan.

[1] Wilfred G. Burchett, *Again Korea* (International Publishers, N.Y., 1968), p. 78

[2] Kim Chol Sik, *op. cit.*

[3] Kim Il Sung, *Rev. . . . op. cit.* p. 78



Cartography by Robert Ante.

The Chemical Industry

The chemical industry of the DPRK, in order to meet the demands of agriculture and the consuming population, is oriented towards the production of mineral fertilizers and synthetic fibers. The chemical industry enjoyed a significant development under the Japanese but experienced the same post-war fate as the other industries mentioned.

The major center of the chemical industry is at Hamhung. Several factors locate the chemical industry here: first, abundant fuel and energy are available from the Kowon anthracite coal basin and the Hamhung hydroelectric station; second, there are abundant raw materials—anthracite for the production of hydrogen and ammonia, pyrite for the production of sulphuric acid, apatites for phosphorous fertilizers. The largest fertilizer plant in the DPRK is located here, producing ¾ of the DPRK's nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizers. During the Korean War, beginning on July 11, 1950, the Hamhung fertilizer plant received 36,000 bombs and shells.[1] The DPRK has given the production of chemical fertilizers special attention with corresponding results. In 1964, the DPRK produced 750,000 tons of fertilizer[2] and by 1970, increased this figure to 1.5 million tons. Hamhung is also an important center for the production of synthetic fibers. A popular synthetic fiber is Vynalon, developed in 1939 by the Korean chemist Li Sung Gi.[1] The industry at Hamhung is based upon local limestone deposits.

[1] Burchett, *op. cit.* p. 67
[2] Kim Il Sung, *op. cit.* p. 80

Light Industry

Space limitations prohibit a detailed discussion of such a complex phenomenon as light industry. Approximately half of the DPRK's consumer goods are produced in local factories. However, we may note that the main centers of the textile industry are at Pyongyang and Kuson. The food industry is also concentrated at Pyongyang. As the Koreans themselves note, the quality of their consumer goods is not yet very high, but, in 1970, over 400 million meters of cloth were produced (See Table IV).

The Transformation of Agriculture in the DPRK

As noted earlier, before the founding of the DPRK, the northern part of Korea was a food deficit area. One of the first problems facing the new government was to transform the patterns inherited from Japanese colonialism. Already, on February 19, 1947, Kim Il Sung stated that "the immediate task of the North Korean agricultural economy is the solution of the food problems. North Korea must be transformed from a region of food shortage into a region of abundance. This can only be done by enlarging the area of cultivation and increasing the rate of production."[2]

[1] *Ibid,* p. 188; Burchett, *op. cit.* pp. 139-140
[2] Quoted from Chong-sik Lee "Land reform, collectivization, and the peasants in North Korea," *China Quarterly* No. 14 (April-June 1963), p. 71

In order to accomplish these "immediate tasks" it was necessary to transform the social foundations of the rural landscape, expand and improve the area under cultivation, change the kinds of crop cultivated, and intensify and mechanize cultivation.

Transforming the social foundations of the rural landscape. One of the first moves carried out by the DPRK was the confiscation of land owned by the Japanese, traitors, churches, and landlords with more than 5 *chongbo*[1] or land that was continuously rented.[2] The bulk of this land was given to landless tenants and farmers with little land. However, the amount of land distributed to each farmer was small and the small holdings retarded further agricultural development. Thus, in 1953 the process of collectivizing agriculture began and was completed in 1958,, when the collectives were reorganized into larger units—from units averaging 80 families to units averaging 300 families. In 1960, state farms worked 16.1 per cent of the land and cooperatives—83.9 per cent. There has been little change since then.

Expanding and improving the area under cultivation. As the map shows, Korea is a mountainous country and has about 16 per cent of its land defined as arable—about the same percentage as Japan. In 1964, the DPRK had 4,942,000 acres of worked land. This is a significant expansion from the 3,459,000 acres in 1958, which itself was an increase of 1,136,700

acres, compared with the preceding two years. Perhaps a clearre concept of the arable land available to the DPRK is that the DPRK's nutritional density[3] is only 0.42 acres per capita.

[1] One *chongbo* is the equivalent of 0.9917 ha. or 2.41 acres.
[2] See Chong-sik Lee, *op. cit.* p. 68
[3] The ratio of population to cultivated land.

Moreover, this worked land is unevenly distributed. The provinces of Hwanghae-namdo and Pyongan-namdo contain over ⅓ the worked land in the DPRK. The plan is to increase the arable land by 15 per cent in the next five yaers.

Amelioration of the land. The process of ameliorating the agricultural land in Korea on a large scale was initiated by the Japanese, who considered Korea as their "rice bowl." Already, in 1919, under the "More Rice Plan," the Japanese were expanding the area under irrigation. Later, the Japanese initiated a five-year plan to increase rice production to 45 million bushels *per annum*, of which 25 million were to be exported to Japan. Although the planned production goal was not met, the export goals were met, and, by 1933, half of Korea's rice production was exported to Japan.[1]

In 1966, the irrigated area was about 1,616,000 acres, or almost ⅓ of the cultivated land area in Korea.[2] Most of the irrigated land is located in the western part of the country. In Hwanghae-namdo province almost 40 per cent of the cultivated land is irrigated artificially. Next is Pyongan-namdo, with 31 per cent (or 284,000 acres) of the total provincial cultivation land under irrigation. Pyongan-pukdo has 227,340 acres under cultivation. On the eastern part of the country, the main region is Hamgyong-namdo, where 148,620 acres or 32 per cent of all the cultivated land is irrigated. These irrigated fields are used mainly for rice production.

Flood prevention is another technique used in the DPRK for improving agricultural productivity. About 20 per cent (or 864,490 acres) of the DPRK's fields are protected from floods. Another aspect of flood prevention is reforestation. Many poor peasants, especially during the Japanese occupation, practiced slash-and-burn migratory cultivation in the mountain areas, destroying much of the forest cover. The reforested areas have increased by six times from 1946 to 1964.

Mineral fertilizers have increased significantly in production (see above) and utilization. In 1964, about 268 lbs. of fertilizers were applied to each acre of cultivated land on the average, of which 375 lbs./acre were applied to irrigated lands and 241 lbs./acre to dry fields.[1] 16 1967, about 601 lbs./acre were applied to irrigated fields and 426 lbs./acre to dry fields. From 1961 to 1969, the ultilization of fertilizers increased by 3.3 times.[2]

[1] Han, *op. cit.*, p. 480
[2] *Note*: The *Kratkaya Geograficheskaya Entsiklopediya* states that by 1958 the irrigated area increased by 1,136,700 acres over 1956 to about 3,459,000 acres.

Mechanization. Very closely related to the amelioration of the soil is the application of inanimate power. Only about 60 per cent of the DPRK's arable land is flat enough for the utilization of tractors. The other 1,729,700 acres of arable land are hampered by topography, but even here, research is being done on smaller types of equipment. In 1953, the DPRK had only 15 machine tractor stations with 500 tractors (in units of 15 hp.); in 1953—only 2,092; in 1959—8,050;[3] in 1965—20,000;[4] 1969—25,000,[5] and by 1970, over 30,000.[6] This means that there is about one tractor for every 169 acres of cultivated land.[7] Today, about half the land worked utilizes tractors. However, the utilization of electricity for powering threshing and winnowing equipment, etc. should not be overlooked.[8] Already by 1964, the DPRK supplied 95.5 per cent of the rural ri and 81 per cent of the farm houses with electricity.[9] Mechanization in the DPRK is most advanced on the large plains of Pyongan-namdo, Hwanghae-namdo, Pyongan-pukdo and Hamgyong-namdo.

[1] Martynov, *op. cit.* p. 134
[2] Kim Chol Sik, *op. cit.*
[3] Yoon T. Kuark, *op. cit.* p. 84
[4] Kim Il Sung, *Rev.* . . . p. 84
[5] Martynov, *op. cit.* p. 135
[6] Suret-Canale, *op. cit.* p. 57
[7] In 1969 this figure was 1 tractor for every 198 acres.
[8] Acc. to Kim Chol Sik, *op. cit.*, agriculture consumes over one billion KWH of electricity.
[9] Kim Il Sung, *Rev.* . . . *op. cit.*

Intensification and double-cropping. Korea shares a common agricultural tradition with China and Japan and practices a similar technology. Intercropping—the planting of different

crops between the rows—is common in the DPRK. Another common practice is double-cropping, where two crops are harvested from one field in the course of a year. This is very common in South Korea, but in 1946 the cropping index for the DPRK was only 106. In 1964, the DPRK's cropping index was reported to be 170.[1] This is the equivalent of several hundred thousand acres of land added to cultivation. Usually the first crop is paddy rice followed by another grain.

[1] Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 133

Changing crop combinations. The most important changes in the crops grown in the DPRK have been the increase in rice production, the increase in maize production and vegetable production and the decline in millet production. Compared with 1946, in 1965 two times as much rice and over six times as much maize were produced.

The main grain in the DPRK is rice, accounting for about 20 per cent of the cultivated area and about half of the harvested grains. As a result of the improvements mentioned above, the DPRK's average rice yield per acre increased from 2,677 lbs. in 1949 to 3,774 lbs. in 1960, which approaches very close to yields in Japan.[2] The chief producing areas are in the western parts of the country and along the coast. Four provinces, Hwanghae-namdo, Pyongan-namdo, Pyongan-pukdo, and Hamgyong-namdo produce over 80 percent of the country's gross rice harvest.

[2] Suret-Canale, *op. cit.*, p. 59. His figures have been recalculated as follows: 30q/ha=2,676.8 lbs./Ac. and 42.3q/ha=3,774.4 lbs./Ac.

The second most important grain, maize, occupies 25 per cent of the cultivated area and is grown on dry fields. The major producers are Pyongan-namdo, Pyongan-pukdo, Hwanghae-namdo and Hwanghae-pukdo. Maize is an important crop in the mountain areas of Yanggangdo.

Spring wheat and barley are grown in rotation with dry field rice, Italian millet and soy beans. Until recently, the millets occupied a major position among Korea's crops, but they have been displaced by maize. Generally speaking, in the DPRK, Italian millet (*Sataria italica*) is important in the north and kaoliang in the south.

Soybeans, that universal food of the Orient, occupies about 15 per cent of the agricultural area and is ubiquitous. Sweet potatoes and potatoes are found in the highest cultivated areas.

Technical and medicinal crops such as cotton, flax, tobacco, sugar beets, peanuts and ginseng are also cultivated. On the whole, the technical crops are not very profitable and have not been promoted. As Table X shows, cotton production has declined from 78 thousand tons in 1949 to 7,000 tons in 1960, largely because of its substitution by synthetic fibers.[1] In 1960, about 71,660 acres were under cotton, mainly in Pyongan-namdo and Hwangae-namdo. The main area for flax production is in Yanggangdo, while flax is also important in the other northern provinces. Tobacco is produced mainly in Pyongan-namdo and also in Hwanghae-namdo.

Not far from the city of Kaesong are located large plantations devoted to ginseng production. The Koreans developed the skill of cultivating this wild plant hundreds of years ago. The most favorable climatic and soil conditions for ginseng cultivation are in the region of Kaesong and Kaesong ginseng is a traditional Korean export commodity. Under the Japanese, ginseng became a government monopoly.[2]

[1] Suret-Canale, *op. cit.*, p. 59

[1] Han Woo-keun, *op. cit.* p. 469

Silk-worm breeding is one of the DPRK's major agricultural activities. Mulberry plantations make up 123,550 acres and produce 9 to 10,000 tons of cocoons per year. However, in recent years the Koreans have also been using oak and castor-oil plants to feed the silkworms. The main silkworm breeding province is Pyongan-pukdo, followed by Pyongan-namdo and Hamgyong-namdo and Hwanghae-pukdo. These four provinces produce ⅔ of all the cocoons of the country.

The DPRK is also an important producer of apples, pears, etc.

Livestock. Typical of East Asian cultures, the milk cow is uncommon. Of Korea's 700,000 head of cattle only 50,000 are milk cows. Most of the remainder are draft animals although some beef cattle are raised—especially in Yanggangdo and Hamgyong-pukdo. More numerous are the swine (1.4 million head), ¼ of which are located in Pyongan-namdo. Large numbers of

TABLE X

Gross Harvests of the Main Kinds of Agricultural Crops in the DPRK (thousand tons)

	1946	*1949*	*1953*	*1956*	*1960*	*1965*	*1966*	*1970*	*1976 (planned)*
Grain crops*	1898	2654	2327	2873	3803	4526		6000	7 to 7.5 million tons
of which									
rice	1052	1158	1229	1392	1535	2103	—	3000	3500
maize	156	375	224	760	950	—	—	2000	
Cotton	15	78	18	5	7	—			
Flax	3		3—	5	23	—			
Vegetables	623	797	466	1049	2063	—			

* including soy beans

swine are also located in Pyongan-pukdo, Hwanghae-pukdo, Hwanghae-namdo, Hamgyong-pukdo and Hamgyong-namdo. Large numbers of sheep and goats are found in Hamgyong-pukdo and Hamgyong-namdo.

Economic Regions of the DPRK

In summary, three major economic regions can be recognized in the DPRK: the industrial eastern coast, the central mountain region, and the western region.

The industrial region of the eastern coast has significant agriculture and fishing along the seacoast and contains the main industrial base of the DPRK with metallurgy, chemical industry, machine-building, construction materials, food industries. The main industrial centers are at Hungham and Chonjin. Grains are important: rice, barley, millet, kaoliang. Sweet potatoes, potatoes, and soybeans play a major role. The eastern coast also contains the major fishing bases of the DPRK: Wonsan, Sinpo, Kim Chaek, Chonjin, Unggi.

The central mountain region specializes in the extractive industries. The DPRK's main forest area and main hydroelectric reserves are here along with the main hydroelectric stations: Supung, Changjingang, Pujonho, Hochongang. Mining is important with brown coal at Aojiri, iron ore at Musan, copper at Kangsan and the poly-metals at Kamdok. Agriculture is poorly developed compared with the other areas.

The western region contains a developed industry and agriculture. This region contains the largest areas of flat, low-lying land and specializes in the production of grain and cotton. The main crop is rice. Industry plays an important role here and the largest industrial center in the DPRK, Pyongyang, is located here. After 1953, steel was produced here.

The People of the DPRK: Their Cultural and Productive Transformation

So far, the most important resource of the DPRK has not been discussed—its people. It should not be forgotten that in the final analysis what we have been discussing is the regional division of human activity and its transformation, even if only in an indirect manner. The industry of the DPRK is of human invention. The extraction and exploitation of its mineral and energy wealth is a measure of a people who have mastered modern technology. It is the measure of a people's cultural development. The increased agricultural production reflects not the character of a virgin soil, but the technological advancement of a people. As of October, 1963, the DPRK had 11,568,000 people. The 1967 estimated population was 12.6 million. The average population density of the DPRK in 1963 was 246 persons per square mile. Of course, the population is unevenly distributed and Hwanghae-namdo has a density of 1.8 times the national average. Pyongan-namdo, Pyongan-pukdo, and Hwanghae-pukdo have densities of over 259 persons per square mile, while Yanggangdo and Chagangdo are below 129 persons per square mile.

Birth and Death Rates in the DPRK

The birth rates in Table XI are difficult to analyze without more demographic information. An obvious point is the decline in the birth rate during the Korean War. However, without more information on the age structure of the population, specific changes in the pattern of births are difficult to determine. Never-

TABLE XI

Birth, death, and natural increase rates of the DPRK (per thousand)

Year	Births	Deaths	Natural increase
1944	31.3	20.8	10.5
1949	41.2	18.7	22.5
1953	25.1	18.1	7.0
1960	38.5*	10.5*	28.0
1963	42.7	12.8	29.9

Source: V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: *Izdatel'stvo* "Mysl," 1970), p. 59

* Jean Suret-Canale "Le developpement economique de la Republique populaire democatique de Coree" *Annales de Geographie* No. 443. (Jan.-Fev. 1972) LXXXIe annee, p. 58.

theless, the DPRK's crude birth rate is on the high side.

However, the death rates show a definite decline, and since nobody likes to die young, declining death rates reflect a definite advancement of the way of life of the people. During the 1920's and 1930's, Korea's crude death rate was over 45 per thousand. It should be noted that the death rate declined under the Japanese occupation through the introduction of limited sanitation and health measures.[1] The result of the rather high birth rate and the declining death rate gave a natural increase of 29.9 per thousand in 1963. Such a high rate of population increase implies a young population concomitant with a high dependency ratio.[2] This means that the DPRK's productive population must increase labor productivity at a more rapid rate if significant improvements in the people's way of life are to be achieved. Table XII illustrates the rapid growth of the DPRK's population in recent years. The effects of the Korean War can be seen in the figures for sex distribution. Not only did the population decline between 1949 and 1953 by 11.76 per cent, but the sex ratio declined from 49.70 per cent males in 1949 to 46.09 per cent in 1953. This inequality has tended to lessen in recent years (48.71 per cent in 1963), apparently through births.

Movement of the Korean Population

Urban-Rural Migration. Well into the Twentieth Century, Korea was one of the least urbanized Asian countries. In 1925, there were only 850,000 (or 4.4 per cent out of the total population) city-dwelling Koreans.[1] This reflected the Japanese policy of maintaining Korea as a source of agricultural raw materials. As Japanese policies in Korea changed, increased industrialization brought with it increased urbanization. By 1940, Korea had an urban population of 2,821,000 persons, or 11.6 per cent of the total.[2] In 1953, the DPRK had 17.7 per cent of its population considered as urban (See Table XIII). It is possible that the pre-Korean War figure was slightly higher and that many people had to retreat to the countryside during the hostilities. Nevertheless, by 1963, almost 45 per cent of the population was urban. This fact underscores the industrial advancement of the DPRK.

[1] Glen T. Trewartha and Wilber Zelinsky," Population Distribution and Change in Korea" *Geographical Review XLV.I* (January 1955), p. 11-12

[2] The dependency ratio is determined as follows: $\frac{\text{children} + \text{aged}}{\text{Adults}}$

Migration. The Korean people experienced another kind of migration. After Korea became a Japanese protectorate, the Japanese put down Korean opposition partly by killing 12,000 "rioters" in twelve months.[3] By manipulating taxes and prices, the Japanese grabbed the land, creating landless peasants. Some of these peasants practiced slash and burn agriculture in the mountains. Others migrated to Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. While some migration was practiced earlier, a noticeable increase occurred with the Korean Independence Movement[4] and increased until by 1944 there were 1,500,000 Korean emigrants in Manchuria and 185,000 in the Soviet Far East. The Japanese also started a "volunteer" labor system which engaged 2,616,-900 persons in forced labor in Korea, while 723,900 were sent abroad.[5] Many of these migrants were repatriated after the end of World War II and the Korean War, and most of them

TABLE XII

The population of the DPRK according to sex (thousands of persons)

	1946	*1949*	*1953*	*1956*	*1959*	*1960*	*1963*
Total population	9,257	9,622	8,491	9,359	10,392	10,789	11,568
of which:							
male	4,628	4,782	3,982	4,476	5,019	5,222	5,634
female	4,629	4,840	4,509	4,883	5,373	5,567	5,934

Source: V. V. Marytnov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatal'styo "Mysl," 1970), p. 59.

TABLE XIII

Urban and Rural Population of the DPRK
(thousands of persons)

	1953	1956	1959	1960	1963
Total population	8,491	9,359	10,392	10,789	11,568
of which					
urban	1,503	2,714	3,949	4,380	5,148
rural	6,988	6,645	6,443	6,409	6,420
	(per cent)				
Total population	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
of which:					
urban	17.7	29.0	38.0	40.6	44.5
rural	82.3	71.0	62.0	59.4	55.5

Source: V. V. Martynov, *Koreya* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl," 1970), p. 56

opted for the DPRK.

[1] Trewartha, *op. cit.* p. 8

[2] Ibid, *The U.S. Army Area Handbook for Korea* (1964) gives 15.6% urban in 1940 (pp. 51-52). They also give a higher figure for the rural population: 60 per cent in 1964.

[3] J. K. Fairbank, E. O. Reischner & A. M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 482

[4] Hoon K. Lee; "Korean Migrants in Manchuria," *Geographical Review* XXX. 2 (April 1932), pp. 200-201

[5] Han, *op. cit.*, p. 496

The Qualitative Characteristics of the DPRK's Population

So far we have illustrated how the major demographic characteristics for which data are available underscore the advances made by the DPRK's economic development. However, people are more than indices and are not equal with regard to their productive and consumptive aspects. A people's productive capacities are directly related to their educational and social achievements.

Health Care

A healthy people not only feel better but they produce more and pay better dividends for training and skills because they live longer. In 1938, Korea had only 2,931 physicians and most of these were Japanese. Medical schools in Korea were exclusively for Japanese nationals except for one school operated by Christian missionaries.[1] Under the Japanese, the life expectancy of Korea was only 36.3 years for males and 38.5 years for females.[2] With the end of World War II, many of the physicians returned to Japan. The losses to the DPRK became more acute during the Korean War, when many physicians retreated South.[3] Nevertheless, by 1963 the number of physicians and assistant physicians increased to 18,241[4] and in 1961, about 2,000 persons graduated from Medical Schools and vocational institutes.[5] A health insurance plan was introduced for government employees and industrial workers in 1945[6] and apparently

[1] Chae-kyung Oh, *Handbook of Korea* (N. Y. Pageant Press Inc., 1958), p. 354

[2] *U.S. Army Handbook for Korea, op. cit.*, p. 50

[3] *Ibid,* p. 163

[4] *Facts about Korea,* (Foreign Language Publishing House: Pyongyang, 1964), p. 186

[5] *U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit.*, p. 163

[6] *Ibid,* pp. 163-164

since 1953 free medical service is available to the whole population. Obviously, at the present time medical attention is probably uneven both geographically and qualitatively, but great advancements have been made and a bright future lies ahead.

Education and Culture

The Korean people can be proud of the fact that they have maintained their cultural heritage, let alone their identity after the long period of Japanese occupation. The Japanese forbade the Korean people to open up a Korean university and instead opened up a Japanese university — Keijo University — in 1926. Few Koreans were admitted.[1] In 1937, the Japanese announced their notorious assimilation policy. Japanese was to be used exclusively in all state and educational institutions. In 1939, all Koreans were ordered to change their names to Japanese ones. Korean language newspapers and magazines were suppressed.[2]

In 1919, there were 42,767 Japanese children attending 379 schools and 84,306 Korean children attending 498 schools with an additional 4,521 attending 33 private schools. However,



Irrigation systems

these facts should be placed in their proper perspective: the total Japanese population numbered only 336,812 compared with over 20 million Koreans.

During the Korean War, 90 per cent of the DPRK's educational facilities were destroyed, but already by 1955 enrollment reached the pre-war level. By 1963, about 2,600,000 children were in school. Commenting on the seven-year compulsory education started in 1960, the *U.S. Army Handbook* said: "If actually accomplished, this would make North Korea the first state in the Far East to achieve this level of popular education."[3] In 1961, the DPRK had an estimated

[1] Woo-kenn Han, *The History of Korea* (East-West Center News: Honolulu, 1870), p. 489
[2] *Ibid,* p. 495
[3] p. 145

71,000 teachers. 1970 was to mark the introduction of universal compulsory nine-year technical education.

In the area of higher education and technical education, in 1959 there were 37 such schools; in 1965, their number increased to 98, and bebetween 1960 and 1964 their number of students doubled. In 1964, three universities gave doctorate degrees: Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang Medical College, and Kim Ch'aek Polytechnical Institute.

[1] *Ibid,* p. 145
[2] Kim Il Sung, *op. cit.* p. 200

In Conclusion:

Throughout this discussion, several points stand out. First, while the Japanese did initially develop several sectors of the Korean economy, this development was unevenly distributed both spatially and structurally. After Japan's promulgation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, this development was oriented to furnish Japan with war materials for her conquest of Asia. Second, even this skeletal structure, which would have been of great value to the DPRK's further development, was destroyed during the Korean War. Third, since the Korean War, the DPRK, by its own efforts and with aid from the socialist bloc, has been able to completely transform the economic geography of the country. The transformation we have described indicates the kind of economic and social progress that a former colonial country can make under conditions of independence and planned economic development along the lines of a socialist economy.

Angelo D'Angelo, a teacher in the New York City school system and a graduate student at New York University, is a contributing editor to Korea Focus and a sponsor of the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center. In the preparation of this column, he will welcome reader contributions.

REACTION TO THE TALKS IN THE SOUTH

At 10 a.m. on July 4th, local time, in Seoul and Pyongyang, an historic announcement was made simultaneously (the joint communiqué on reconciliation). Guests arriving for the 4th of July party at the American Embassy in Seoul were half dazed. Senior American diplomats were asked by the guests, both Korean and non-Koreans, whether they had known about the secret talks and what they thought about it. For most South Koreans it was a stupendous shock.

* * *

One South Korean Government official was so moved that he praised Premier Kim Il Sung. He was immediately arrested. This swift change is causing untold confusion for South Koreans, particularly in schools where anti-communist education has been an important part of curriculum for more than half a century. All text books have to be revised, adjusted to the "confrontation with dialogue" principles and all teachers will have to be re-educated.

* * *

The development also is a major surprise to hundreds of scholars engaged in Asian studies in the U.S. Many books have become out-dated

overnight. A number of current research papers have to be revised. The July 4 Joint Communiqué of North and South Korea, which may eventually lead to unification, has given rise to a rash of speculation, rumors, truths and half truths. Take your choice.

Pyongyang and Seoul will soon establish a Pan-Korea tourism agency to facilitate movement of foreign tourists across the Korean frontier. The opening will be established in Central Korea so that the Japanese visitors may enter North Korea to visit the Diamond Mountains. Eastern European visitors may enter South Korea via Panmunjon. A remote possibility is a joint committee to develop the Diamond Mountains.

"Experts" predict that Seoul and Pyongyang will soon initiate fishery negotiations for limited operations of South Korean fishery boats off the North Korean coast for which in exchange South Korea will provide freighters to North Korea. The same "experts" also "predict" that railway communication will be opened between Munsan and Kaesun and the Panmunjon area will become an "international" commercial terminal point with storage, customs and transfer facilities. According to South Korea newspapers, the July "Reconciliation Communiqué" is causing shock waves and sleepless nights to the military in South Korea. According to these reports, the reactions and tension across the Korean frontier (38 parallel) means a lessening and belittlement to the relative prominence of the South Korean Army and its feed-bag. It seems like a military career in South Korea, will lose its glamor. The big problem is how to keep ambitious officers bucking for promotions contented. What really hurts most is that with the reduction of armed forces in the offing, some of them will not only not get a promotion but may have to join the growing army of unemployed in South Korea and a few of them may have to go to work for an honest living.

SOUTH KOREAN RICE IMPORTED

Future Koreans will be paying—for many many years—for rice they had not eaten but had been consumed by their parents and grandparents. Today's policy-makers in South Korea are leaving behind ever-increasing ancestral debts.

Rice, for example, is imported from Japan under a 30-year long-term concessional sales agreement with a ten-year grace period. The payments for the Japanese rice imported in 1971 will start in 1932 and will last for 20 years, the final payment due in 2001. A South Korean born in 1972—and who is not responsible for the debt—will be paying for it until he is 29 years old.

Imports of the Japanese rice will continue. So a South Korean born in 1973 will be doing the same thing until he is 29, and so on, and cries of new-born Korean babies will become louder and louder.

SOUTH KOREAN WAGES

M. O. Lee, chairman of the Vanity Fair Corp., in an address before the Alabama State Chamber of Commerce, recently said:

"How can our workers compete with those in Japan who average 39 cents an hour in the apparel industry; with those in Hong Kong where the average hourly wage for clothing workers is 26 cents; with Taiwan and its 15-cents-an-hour scale and with Korea which pays its workers an average of nine cents an hour in the apparel industry? Try to compete with them."

UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

A sign of the unemployment situation in South Korea: 8,000 Koreans, many skilled technicians, applied for 95 "laborer" job openings in Guam.

U.S. BASES IN KOREA

The March 27 issue of the *U.S. News & World Report* said there are more American military bases in South Korea than in any other Asian nation. The magazine said:

Korea: 36 bases; 32 Army, 4 Air Force with 43,000 men.

Japan: 23 bases: 12 Army, 5 Air Force, 6 Navy and Marine with 30,000 men.

Okinawa 21 bases: 13 Army, 6 Navy and Marine, 2 Air Force, with 45,000 men.

Philippines: 6 bases; 5 Navy, 1 Air Force with 18,000 men.

Taiwan: 4 bases; 3 Air Force, 1 Navy with 9,000 men.

SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

The South Korean forces in Vietnam are getting unfavorable publicity.

The *Wall Street Journal,* on May 15, reported from Saigon the following description of a South Vietnamese legislative debate:

"Will (Nixon) not send the Marines?" the deputy asks. That might be difficult for Mr. Nixon, he is told.

"Then he can send us more Koreans," the deputy says. But perhaps the Koreans don't want to lose more troops in Vietnam, it is suggested.

"That's no problem," the deputy says. "You just pay them more, and they will come."

* * *

That the "liberal opposition" of South Vietnam now wants President Nixon to buy Vietnam some more battalions of Koreans is somehow symptomatic of this (South Vietnamese) society.

* * *

Sen. Clifford P. Case (Republican-New Jersey) called the Korean forces in South Vietnam "Korean mercenaries" in an article published in the *Christian Science Monitor,* May 15.

South Korean Defense Minister Jaehung Yu told the National Assembly this month that Seoul will not send additional units to South Vietnam. Yu said casualties will be replaced "only within the fixed ceiling."

Yu admitted that the South Korean troops have avoided "risky" operations this year to keep their casualties down.

Yu also admitted that South Korea had to turn down Saigon's requests for expansion of the South Korean operational area to cover Kontum and Pleiku.

* * *

On May 6, Hong-il Kim, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, called for an early pullout of the South Korean forces from Vietnam. Kim said he saw no reason to postpone Korean withdrawals "when the USA continues to pull out its forces regardless of war situations."

* * *

Orr Kelly, the *Washington Star's* Pentagon reporter, said the Nixon Doctrine is now facing an important test in South Vietnam with the South Vietnamese virtually on their own on the ground.

Kelly said, May 9: "The South Koreans fought one important action, clearing Highway 19 between the coast and the Central Highland. But for the most part, they, like the Americans, have been avoiding casualties."

ADMITS SEOUL REGIME IS REPRESSIVE

On May 10, a nationally-syndicated column by Paul Harvey carried the headline, "Korea Wasn't Worth the Cost." The column, based on information reported by Keyes Beech of the *Chicgao Daily News,* said:

In Congress and out, some of our most militant hawks have become doves. Why would they rather switch than fight?

Until 1968, Paul Harvey urged decisive military victory in Vietnam.

The deciding factor in that difficult reversal of my own position was a post-mortem on our other unwon war in Korea.

We fought long and hard and at astronomical cost to "save" South Korea from the "Communists" of North Korea.

We spent 34,000 American lives to "rescue" South Korea from dictatorship.

Yet despite that expenditure and our continuing costly occupation, South Korea has a military dictatorship.

The political dictatorship led by South Korean President Chung Hee Park is altogether as rigid, as confining, as punitive as the dictatorships of fascist Greece and Spain.

In Seoul, politics is discussed in whispers, if at all. Telephones are bugged. The news media is rigidly censored. Frequently the five different newspapers run identical editorials the same day. Any "independent" newsman gets arrested, roughed up, fired.

Freedom of speech and assembly have been suspended indefinitely. No student demonstrates for or against anything.

South Korea is in the cast-iron grip of total political dictatorship.

UNREST IN SOUTH KOREA

(1) The South Korean Army Security Command announced on June 1 that it uncovered major irregularities in the military procurement establishment. The command said two brigadier generals and four colonels were arrested for having accepted kickbacks amounting to $450,000 from 57 local suppliers.

Disciplinary actions were taken against 45 others, including a major general, the command said.

(2) On June 5, truncheon-swinging riot police broke up a street demonstration by opposition New Democratic Party members of the National Assembly. It was the first major act of protest in South Korea since the proclamation of a national emergency in December 1971.

The opposition members protested against the ruling party's six-month absence from the assembly.

About 80 opposition legislators and an estimated 100 legislative aides fought their way from the National Assembly building to the Capitol—a distance of about half a mile—with five of them slightly hurt in pushing and shoving.

TEAM TO SOUTH KOREA FOR POET'S RELEASE

A group of some 10 Japanese intellectuals is planning to visit the Republic of Korea around the end of this month to seek the release of young Korean poet Kim Ji Ha.

This was announced in Tokyo by Makoto Oda, leader of the International Committee for Saving Kim Ji Ha.

The 31-year-old poet was arrested for the publication two years ago of "Five Bandits" critical of the Korean regime. He has reportedly been forced to stay in a clinic for treatment of a lung disease.

Oda said that the committee decided to go to Seoul for the release-Kim campaign after receiving since early this month hundreds of signatures from peoples of the world, as well as of Japan, supporting the early release of Kim.

The anti-war movement leader, however, said that the general public in Korea may not be aware of Kim's case because of strict censorship by the authorities.

SOUTH KOREAN LAWMAKERS PROTEST

Lawmakers of the opposition New Democratic Party recently clashed with riot police as they staged a street demonstration in protest against the ruling party's boycott of parliamentary sessions.

It was the first street demonstration since a state of national emergency was declared by President Park Chung Hee December 6. All outdoor political rallies are banned by the declaration.

* * *

The U.S. and the DPRK

On June 23, Kim Byong Sik, first vice-chairman of the 600,000-member General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, had a three-hour interview with Thomas Pepper, the Tokyo bureau chief of the *Baltimore Sun*.

Speaking for the DPRK, Kim said he would welcome an invitation from an American newspaper or academic group to visit the U.S.

Kim admitted that he was responsible for arranging the North Korean visits for *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* reporters.

With American newsmen entering Pyongyang, it will be difficult for Seoul to keep insisting that North Koreans—in North Korea or abroad—should be kept away from the U.S.

* * *

Sen. Church and Korea

Sen. Frank Church, a leading anti-war figure in the U.S. Congress, has again called for American military withdrawal from Korea, Taiwan and Indochina. In testimony before the Democratic Party platform committee on foreign affairs, Church said, June 22:

"We should now contemplate the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, Korea, as well as from Indochina.

"Once American forces are removed from the Asian mainland, an indigenous, Asian balance of power could come into being, with China, Japan and the Soviet Union as its major components."

* * *

North Koreans Expect World Trade to Treble

North Korean export trade will treble that of 1970 by 1976, the last year of its six-year economic plan.

The official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said imports will also show "a marked rise" and that more countries will do business with the DPRK.

It said by 1976, the DPRK will be exporting universal lathes and other modern machine tools of "high efficiency," sets of plants, steel alloy, including high-speed steel and lead and zinc products in large quantities.

Japan and the Nixon Doctrine

By DAVID BUEHRENS
Editorial Associate, *New World Review*

Japanese Imperialism Today by Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack. Association for Radical East Asian Sturies (Areas) (London), paper, 10 pence. (1972)

Two young British scholars have put together a detailed and illuminating study of Japan's rapidly outthrusting economic empire and, implicitly, the role that it plays within the larger U.S. scheme of things. As one plods through the mass of economic, military and political information in this short book there is a depressing sense of *deja vu,* particularly if he has, like this writer, been browsing in books like *When Japan Goes to War* (O. Tanin and E. Yohan, International Publishers, 1936) or the more recent *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* (David Bergamini, Morrow, 1971).

The chief thrust of the latter book, admittedly limited, in many areas, is that moral responsibility for imperialist aggression is borne by the top leadership, who of course included many more than Hirohito and his circle. The same feeling comes through in Halliday's and McCormack's book, and once again, although even more so, the responsibility must be shared by the U.S. rulers who carefully incubated this incipient return of Japanese imperialism. One considers the mindless, murderous ferocity of which U.S. imperialism has shown itself capable in Asia, as well as its never-ceasing efforts to get others as co-brutalizers to "share the load," with numerous futile pressures on NATO allies, and one recalls the unspeakable rape of Nanking of 1937-38, and numerous other maddening and grisly cruelties, including those wrought by Japanese in Korea over many decades.

It is clear then, after reading Halliday's and McCormack's book what a pivotal role Japan is equipped to play in the seventies and eighties as the key guardian of the "Nixon doctrine" of "self-determination" for Asia. Repeated statements by U.S. military leaders have made clear the high importance they place on Japan's ability to—and one chokes at the phrase—"preserve stability in Asia." In the thirties, however, the results for those who nurtured rightist aggression with huge economic and political support were not exactly what they intended. The Frankensteins got hideously out of control for all concerned, and one fears that it could happen again. The prospect of a Japan, instead of a U.S. being involved in a military intervention in South Korea, or even in Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia within a few years, are by no means negligible.

Before dispelling the still fashionable myth that Japan's military potential does not even now constitute a serious danger, the authors of this study survey the results of the American Occupation of Japan. They reject the standard wisdom that the Zaibatsu (literally, "wealth families" or huge economic combines) were dismantled.

The strategy of building up Japanese heavy industry predated the Korean War. Also from this early period dates the tying in of the American and Japanese military on the level of "myriad occasions" of technological cooperation between U.S. and Japanese corporations for "defense" equipment and on that of organizational strategy: Japanese bases, military intelligence *and troops* were used in the Korean War, the authors report and of course, as other histories show, Japanese officers and troops proved of great service to the U.S. in providing for a "smooth transition" to native governments amenable to Western control, as in China, Indo-China, the Philippines and, of course, Korea, thus excluding the partisans from their popular mandate of power at war's end. (See Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: the U.S. in World Affairs, 1943-45,* 1968). The purpose from the

beginning, let us not forget, was to use Japan and the surrounding island chains which she commanded, as the new Pacific base for the extension of U.S. power, air, sea and land power.

Many tactics are designed to conceal and further this process; the so-called "reversion" of Okinawa, where U.S. bases are retained; the claimed removal of U.S. nuclear arms to areas still close to Japan, the "mutual security" treaties, strategic investmnets, loans, licensing agreements, restrictive trade pacts are but a few.

Southeast Asia is still a crucial area for Japanese monopoly capitalism, as it was in the days of "Co-Prosperity"; Vietnam has been a bonanza for Japanese exports and capital outlays as well as contractors for military procurement by the U.S. In one year, 1968, the official U.S. figures for U.S. "defense" expenditures in Japan, almost all of it tied to the war, totalled almost $600 million more than in Vietnam itself. South Korea and Taiwan have, of course, "benefitted" also, although not nearly as much, and have also been subject to increasingly large Japanese economic control. The Japanese motorcycles that roar through the streets of Saigon are but a small symbol of a new reality.

Curiously—or perhaps typically—Japanese "reparations" agreements with the Southeast Asian countries were planned and administered by Japanese businessmen, and have proved to be a handy way to unload exports and acquire new raw material sources, capital outlets and controls. As Malaysia's Tunku Abdul Rahman, no flaming radical, put it, Japan "takes back with its other hand, as if by magic almost twice the amount that it provides." Such magic is as old as capitalism and as recent as "Beneficial Finance Company."

The export of a bullet-manufacturing plant to the Philippines as part of "reparations" grimly expresses the essence. Halliday and McCormack provide in their book elaborate statistical breakdowns of the nature and direction of Japanese "foreign aid" and other commercial transactions. The Sato-Nixon talks of late 1970 highlighted a stronger Japanese push into Indochina, and in September 1971, at a Cabinet Ministers' conference, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers called for a "substantial, indeed dramatic increase" in Japanese "aid" to developing countries, particularly those of Indochina. The reasons why the Japanese have not done such profitable business with the People's Republic of China, is that the U.S. carefully excluded Japan from the Chinese market with a uniquely severe embargo list in 1951; the Chinese in turn, who suffered eleven to fifteen million dead and 60 million homeless in the Japanese war, properly demanded $50 billion in reparations and have followed a policy of selective discrimination against Japanese firms with substantial interests in Taiwan. However the prospects now seem to be good for a substantial rise in Sino-Japanese trade, the total volume of which was over $800 million in 1970.

Of course, in absolute figures, as Halliday and McCormack show, the present volume of Southeast Asian Trade and investment—even that for Asia as a whole—is, for the Japanese ruling class and for us, not an accurate index of its overall strategic importance to the U.S. or Japan. Special raw material resources and needs—specifically oil and lumber in Japan's case; potential growth, relative profit possibilities, geography and other considerations have to be kept in mind: capitalism often depends on margins and special opportunities that do not seem large in themselves but provide an irreplaceable element in the dynamic of exploitation. Thus Japan's major trade and investment is still with the non-Asian world, but absolute, official figures are deceptive; India and Pakistan, for example, have received perhaps $12 million in Japanese private capital "which has been important in the imperialist consortia propping up the ruling cliques" in those countries; and Japanese investment in the Philippines is hardly any larger, although "something like $350 million of private unrecorded Japanese loans "were" floating around—all of which could be converted into investment at short notice, and in terms of real power was probably acting as such already."

One of the merits of this book is the way it punctures the usual glib, mechanical cliches about imperialism which fail to comprehend it as an organic, concrete phenomenon. Rates, trends and strategic functions have to be taken into account as in Japan's underwriting of the shaky currencies of Laos and Cambodia, or her huge loans to South Korea. The experience of the latter country is hardly encouraging as to the benefits of foreign capital, and it tells an old story: the sheer burden of debts to Japan "now threatens to cripple the entire economy, as well

as having driven it into a state of total vassalage to the U.S. and Japan and their puppet agencies," such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, according to Halliday and McCormack. Yet this would not be apparent from a simple reading of the figures for Japanese investment in Korea.

Halliday and McCormack note the importance of access to huge stores of raw materials for the Japanese. With the discovery of new oil resources off the coast of Vietnam and elsewhere, and with the uncertainties of the Mideast, the Japanese have made prodigious efforts to diversify their oil supplies, adding a further stimulus in a vital area closely linked with U.S. investments in and out of Japan, to the recartelization of the Japanese economy.

As for the Japanese military, we are often assured that it is miniscule in actual potential for foreign intervention. First of all, such estimates usually ignore the national police force, a paramilitary outfit now known as the "Self-Defense Force." But the armed forces themselves for several reasons can be seen to possess ominous capabilities already.

For one thing, all three branches of the forces are heavily over-officered, which means personnel could be quintupled on very short notice. The military is now pushing the idea of reserves in the form of a kind of Japanese National Guard, as well as extending recruitment activity and propaganda among students and the civilian population.

In addition, the projected rate of acceleration in "defense" expenditure for 1972-76 is quite impressive: the 1970 budget allocated $1.6 billion to the military, while in 1976 they will be "the mightiest non-nuclear power in the world, if it is still non-nuclear." Here again there are continual pressures for revising and overriding the Japanese Constitution, which forbids such armament. Japanese Minister of Defense Nakasone in 1970, after conferring with Nixon and Laird in the U.S. announced publicly that Japan would not acquire nuclear weapons as long as the American deterrent remained "credible." In the light of the smokescreen of the vaunted Nixon Doctrine, this is hardly very reassuring.

The key area, the chief barometer, of Japanese military expansion has historically been Korea, from the legendary invasion of Korea by the Empress Jingo about 200 A.D. to the era of Hideyoshi to the aggression of 1894, through the Second World War and the Korean War to the present. "Since total incorporation in the Japanese empire in 1910," wrote the authors, "Korea suffered a repression as savage and an exploitation as total as any colony in modern times." It has now been revealed that "contingency" military plans exist for Japanese occupation of both Korea and Manchuria, as well as blockade of China and martial law within Japan.

This "Mitsuya Plan" would involve an occupation of South Korea and an invasion of the North. The Japanese military have maintained close contact with the Seoul military; the well-known fact that dictator Park Chung Hee was a Japanese officer during the occupation symbolizes the relationship. The U.S. State Department is on record as confirming heavy Japanese troop involvement in the event of a new flare-up in Korea. One must assume this is also one important reason why the U.S. clings so tenaciously to the UN flag in South Korea, according to the Seoul regime itself.

These factors and the increasingly cozy but lop-sided ties between Japanese and South Korean capital, epitomized by the large Pohang integrated steel works show South Korea's continuing subjection to the eastern neighbor. Characteristically, over 50 percent of Japanese "aid" to the Seoul regime is really going into the hands of the greatly expanded Mitsubishi combine. Japan has replaced the U.S. as South Korea's "trade partner."

New developments in relations between the two Koreas since this book was completed add a new element to this situation, in my opinion, and will probably strengthen the opposition within South Korea to the rising influence of Japanese imperialism. As for the majority of the Koreans still in Japan, it is generally recognized that they strongly favor the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They know their former masters only too well and those who fought them. Like their heroic brothers in Indochina, they know that old wine in new bottles is still old wine. Halliday and McCormack have made it clear that it is also poisoned wine. "In the long run," they conclude "there can be no squaring of the interests of the Japanese ruling elite with those of the masses of the people of the region."

Support Victims of U.S. Aggression in Vietnam

The picture of the girl on the back cover of this issue is taken from a poster being widely distributed throughout the world as part of Youth Accuses Imperialism, a campaign which was launched by the World Federation of Democrative Youth jointly with the International Union of Students. The campaign has been endorsed by 230 national and international organizations in 90 countries. Its objective is support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of hospitals and other institutions in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which have been destroyed by United States air bombardment. The campaign's first aim is to build a modern Pediatric Institute in Hanoi to be named after Nguyen Van Troi, a young Vietnamese patriot executed for fighting for the liberation of South Vietnam. A report on the youth activities in various countries on behalf of the campaign to date follows:

Japan: The Democratic Youth League has raised 3 million yen and sent its sixth solidarity ship to Hanoi. The group pledges to raise 10 million yen for the Nguyen Van Troi Pediatric Institute. One branch of the League has pledged 30,000 yen, the price of one hospital bed. Another branch has raised 5,000 yen to buy and equip an operating theatre. Working with the League in its campaign are the Socialist Youth League, The National Council of Choir Groups and Zengakuren (All Japan Federation of Students Autonomies) and sections of trade union youth.

Finland: The Democratic Youth Union is selling badges, staging concerts by young artists and holding solidarity meetings to raise money.

Puerto Rico: The socialist youth, the communist youth, the University Federation for Independence and other youth organizations are out to raise $5,000.

Greece: The Communist Youth has a goal of $2,000 of which $1,000 has already been sent to the Nguyen Van Troi hospital bank account.

France: The Communist Youth Movement has produced posters, folios, and special checks, called 'Dongs for Solidarity' to raise money for the hospital.

Venezuela: The Federation of University Centres and the Zulia University in Maracaibo have sent $100 in their fund raising campaign for the hospital.

Canada: The Vancouver Hospital Committee has pledged to raise $5,000 and is organizing and planning to hold four concerts, film shows, dances, bazaars and appeals via press, radio and television.

West Germany: The Socialist German Youth are setting a target of $20,000.

United States: The United States Hospital Committee is appealing to all concerned people of the U.S. to send contributions to the committee. It is also appealing to all youth, especially the organized youth, to initiate campaigns in their own names for fund raising activities for building the hospital. The Committee is offering literature, posters and buttons to be used in the drive and asks organizations to specify goals of money to be raised for hospital beds, operating theatres and medical equipment.

The Young Workers Liberation League has made the campaign one of its major organizational activities.

For further information contact the United Hospital Committee, 25 West 23rd Street, New York, N. Y.

HOSPITALS
FOR VIETNAMESE CHILDREN VICTIMS OF US AGGRESSORS